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REDEFINING REASONABLE SEIZURES
LAURYN P. GOULDINt
ABSTRACT

The government's power to seize individuals who are suspected of
crimes-by arresting, stopping, or otherwise detaining them-has expanded significantly in the twenty-first century. The Supreme Court's
gradual redefinition of what constitutes a reasonable Fourth Amendment
seizure has occurred without meaningful evaluation of whether the government needs additional seizure or detention power.
There are key differences between search and seizure doctrine that
make the development of a general and unifying explanatory theory of
modem Fourth Amendment search and seizure trends difficult, if not
impossible. These differences suggest that a focused, independent analysis of Fourth Amendment seizure developments (uncoupled from searchand privacy-focused analyses) is overdue.
This Article documents the expansion of seizure power across the
spectrum over the last fifteen years. These cases reveal missed opportunities to provide greater protection to individuals, and they identify spaces where new technologies might justify revisiting settled rules. In addition, these decisions reveal how the Court's reluctance to probe government motivations and to consider less intrusive alternatives undermines
its efforts to balance individual rights against government interests.
The Article then outlines the individual rights and collective interests that are implicated in seizure cases. Finally, the Article analyzes the
problems presented by the Court's approach to calculating necessity in
seizure cases. Proposals for reform are focused on four areas: requiring
precise statements of government needs in seizure cases; looking to existing laws, guidelines, and police norms to support (or refute) necessity
claims; requiring greater proof of a need to seize in cases involving more
minor offenses; and considering alternative approaches, technological
changes, and long-term costs in calculating necessity.
f Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. JD, NYU School of Law; AB,
Princeton University. For helpful conversations and insightful comments, I thank Cynthia Alkon,
Miriam Baer, Todd Berger, Steve Clymer, Nicolas Commandeur, Jennifer Daskal, Barry Friedman,
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Corri Zoli, and workshop attendees at the CrimFest Conference at Rutgers Newark Law School, the
Southeastern Association of Law Schools New Scholars' Colloquia, the Buffalo Law Faculty Workshop, and the Law and Society Early Career Workshop. I am also grateful to Rachel Campbell, Amy
Doan, and Jesse Feitel for outstanding research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

In its landmark 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio,I the Supreme Court
emphasized the importance of the individual rights that are infringed by
unlawful seizures of people: "No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law." 2 Nearly fifty years later, this idea that the Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable seizures is one that the Court has "carefully
guarded" seems woefully out of date.
1.
2.
(1891)).

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
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Protests across the country during the past eighteen months against
overly aggressive policing provide ready proof that the Court's potential
as a meaningful constraint on the police has not been realized. The 2014
and 2015 protests were sparked by deaths during street encounters, stops,
and arrests of unarmed black men at the hands of police officers, including Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri; Eric Garner in Staten Island,
New York; Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Ohio; Walter Scott in North
Charleston, South Carolina; Freddie Gray in Baltimore, Maryland; and
Laquan McDonald in Chicago, Illinois. 3
Brown and Garner were killed within weeks of each other during
the summer of 2014.4 Brown's death caused an immediate "eruption of
protests and violence" in Ferguson;5 those protests were reignited months
later when the Ferguson grand jury announced its decision not to indict
the officer who shot Brown.6 When the Staten Island grand jury announced that it, too, was not indicting the officer who put Eric Garner in
the chokehold that caused his death, New Yorkers angrily took to the
streets.7 People in cities across the country followed suit. New protests
3.

Editorial, The Lessons of Baltimore, and Ferguson, and Too Many Places, L.A. TIMES

(Apr. 29, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-baltimore-20150429story.html (describing protests); Mark Berman, How the Response to Protests over Police Force
Changed Between
Ferguson and Baltimore,
WASH.
POST
(May
1,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/05/01/from-ferguson-to-baltimorehow-the-response-to-protests-over-police-force-has-changed-nationwide/ (describing protests); Tony
Briscoe, Laquan McDonaldProtestorsCallfor Special Prosecutor, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 6, 2015, 5:24
PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/localbreaking/ct-chicago-police-laquan-mcdonald-pushprotest-met-20151206-story.html (describing protests).
4.
See Nicole Crowder, The Timeline of Events and Scenes in Ferguson, Mo., Since the

Shooting

of

Michael

Brown,

WASH.

POST

(Aug.

16,

2014),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/08/16/the-timeline-of-events-andscenes-in-ferguson-mo-since-the-shooting-of-michael-brown/ (describing Michael Brown's death on
August 9, 2014, and ensuing protests); Staten Island Man Dies After Police Try to Arrest Him, N.Y.
TIMES (July 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/nyregion/staten-island-man-dies-afterpolice-try-to-arrest-him.html (announcing Eric Garner's death).
5.
Elijah Anderson, What Caused the Ferguson Riot Exists in So Many Other Cities, Too,
WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/13/whatcaused-the-ferguson-riot-exists-in-so-many-other-cities-too/; see also Mark Landler, Obama Offers
New Standards on Police Gear in Wake of Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/1 2 /0 2 /us/politics/obama-to-toughen-standards-on-police-use-ofmilitary-gear.html (describing a "wave of anger at law enforcement officials across the country").
6.
Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not
Indicted, N.Y TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darrenwilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html.
7.
J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave ofProtests After GrandJury Doesn'tIndict Officer

in

Eric

Garner

Chokehold

Case,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Dec.

3,

2014),

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-islandchokehold-death-of-eric-gamer.html. In July 2015, four days before the anniversary of Garner's
death, New York City announced that it had agreed to settle (for $5.9 million) the wrongful death
claim brought by Garner's family. J. David Goodman, Eric Garner Case Is Settled by New York City

for $5.9 Million, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/nyregion/ericgarer-case-is-settled-by-new-york-city-for-5-9-million.html.
8.
Justin Wm. Moyer et al., Protests in Support of Eric Garner Erupt in New York and
Elsewhere, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/moming2 4
mix/wp/2014/1 /0 /after-grand-jury-doesnt-indict-police-officer-who-choked-eric-gamer-protestserupt-in-new-york-and-elsewhere/ (noting that "[a] wave of protests erupted from Manhattan to
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followed the deaths of Tamir Rice, Walter Scott, and Freddie Gray. 9
Most recently, in November 2015, protesters in Chicago took to the
streets when officials (after delaying for more than a year) released video
footage of the October 2014 police shooting of 17-year-old Laquan
McDonald.10
These protests-while set in motion by specific incidents-were
fueled by a broader set of concerns about the role and legitimacy of law
enforcement in heavily policed communities." Underlying these protests
is a realization that police are increasingly using their power to stop or
arrest individuals-not to investigate crimes, but as a means of regulating communities. Indeed, in New York, these protests flowed naturally
from several years of debate and litigation to reform the city's aggressive
stop-and-frisk policing program.12
In December 2014, with the objective of restoring community trust
in the police, President Obama created a Task Force on 21st Century
Policing.' 3 FBI Director Jim Comey, in a February 2015 speech de-

Oakland, Calif." including as examples, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Oakland, Washington, D.C., Seattle,
Atlanta, and Baltimore, among many more). The anniversaries of the deaths of Garner and Brown
led to more protests in the summer of 2015. Benjamin Mueller & Nate Schweber, Eric Garner is
Remembered
One
Year
After
His
Death,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
17,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/18/nyregionleric-gamer-death-anniversary.html;
Wesley Lowery
et al., State of Emergency Declared in Ferguson After Police Shoot and Critically Injure Man During Protests, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.cominews/morningmix/wp/2015/08/1 0/shots-fired-during-protests-in-ferguson-mo-reports-say/.
9.
Peter Hermann et al., After Peaceful Start, Protest of Freddie Gray's Death in Baltimore
Turns Violent, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/baltimorereadies-for-saturday-protest-of-freddie-grays-death/2015/04/25/8cf990f2-e9f8-l le4-aaeld642717d8afa story.html; Alan Blinder & Manny Fernandez, North Charleston Prepares for
Mourning and Protest in
Walter Scott Death, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr.
10,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/l /us/north-charleston-prepares-for-weekend-of-mourning-andprotest-in-walter-scott-shooting.html; Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Says He Shot Tamir Rice After

Fake

Gun

Was

Pulled,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Dec.

1,

2015),

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/us/cleveland-officer-says-he-shot-tamir-rice-after-fake-gunwas-pulled.html (noting that the recent release of information surrounding the shooting has "prompted protests across the country and raised questions about how the police use force and interact with
African-Americans").
10.
Patrick M. O'Connell et al., Laquan McDonald Shooting Protest Groups Plan Friday
March, CHi. TRIB. (Nov. 26, 2015, 4:54 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-cop-

shooting-laquan-mcdonald-protest-1 127-met-20151126-story.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2015).
I1.
Anderson, supra note 5 (describing stop-and-frisk policies and the militarization of police
as creating an atmosphere of "authoritarian oversight and normalized police harassment").

12.
13.

See infra Section III.A. I.
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, Fact Sheet: Task Force on

21st Century Policing (Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Fact Sheet], http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2014/12/18/fact-sheet-task-force-21st-century-policing ("Recent events in Ferguson,
Staten Island, Cleveland, and around the country have highlighted the importance of strong, collaborative relationships between local police and the communities they protect."); see also OFFICE OF
CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST
CENTURY POLICING 1 (2015) [hereinafter TASK FORCE] (explaining that President Obama formed
the task force to respond to "recent events that have exposed rifts in the relationships between local
police and the communities they protect and serve"). The Task Force issued its final report in May
2015 and many of its recommendations are being implemented in jurisdictions around the country.
Id.; see also President Obama, Weekly Address: Continuing Work to Improve Community Policing
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scribed by commentators as unprecedented in its candor,1 4 echoed the
importance of this mission and directly addressed the "disconnect between police agencies and many citizens-predominantly in communities of color."' 5

While this executive branch attention to policing is much needed,
the Court's role in authorizing greater police contact with civilians, and
its potential as a source of restraint, requires scrutiny.' 6 A close examination of seizure cases decided by the Court over the last fifteen years reveals that the government's power to seize individuals suspected of
crimes-by arresting, stopping, or otherwise detaining them-has expanded significantly.
The Terry Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard required "balancing the need to search [or seize]
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails."' 7 Over time,
and perhaps particularly in the twenty-first century, that balance has become skewed in the government's favor in seizure cases. Cases about
arrests,' 8 stops,191920
and search warrant seizures, for example, illustrate
that a gradual redefinition of what constitutes a reasonable seizure has
occurred without meaningful evaluation of whether the government actually needed additional seizure or detention power.
(Aug.
15,
2015)
(transcript
available
at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/08/15/weekly-address-continuing-work-improve-community-policing).

14.
Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Chief Links Scrutiny of Police with Rise in
Violent Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/24/us/politics/fbichief-links-scrutiny-of-police-with-rise-in-violent-crime.html?_r-0
(describing it as an "unusually
candid speech" and observing that "[m]ore than his predecessors, Mr. Comey has used his office as
one of the nation's top law enforcement officials to bring attention to issues that state and local
police departments are confronting").
15.
James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at Georgetown University
(Feb. 12, 2015) (transcript available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-truths-lawenforcement-and-race) ("Serious debates are taking place about how law enforcement personnel
relate to the communities they serve, about the appropriate use of force, and about real and perceived
biases, both within and outside of law enforcement."). More recently, Comey has sparked controversy by expressing concern that "increased attention on the police has made officers less aggressive
and emboldened criminals." James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at Univer-

sity

of

Chicago

Law

School

(Oct.

23,

2015)

(transcript

available

at

https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/law-enforcement-and-the-communities-we-serve-bending-thelines-toward-safety-and-justice) (recognizing that some behavior change is to be welcomed, but
emphasizing the importance of "a strong police presence" to detect and deter violent crime); see also
Schmidt & Apuzzo, supra note 14 (noting that Comey's opinions are not shared by top level Justice
Department officials and outlining disagreement among law enforcement officials as to "whether
there is any credence to the so-called Ferguson effect" (referring to the protests following the events
in Ferguson, MO)).
16.
See infra Part III for a discussion of the appropriate role of the Court in regulating police
behavior.

17. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (alterations in original) (quoting Camara v. Mun.
Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
18. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164
(2008); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
19. See, e.g., Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014); Navarette v. California, 134 S.
Ct. 1683 (2014); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
20. See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005).
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While other scholars have focused generally on the Court's struggle
to weigh government interests in Fourth Amendment cases, these analyses focus principally on cases and developments regarding searches and
privacy, as opposed to seizures of people.21 In recent years, this focus on
privacy and searches has also been driven by technological changes in
the way information is created, maintained, and retrieved. Corresponding
adjustments in societal privacy expectations shift the doctrine governing
searches, demanding attention from the Court and from scholars attempting to predict and to reconcile Court decisions.22 These questions of
modern surveillance and information gathering are irresistibly complex
and undeniably urgent.
In outlining his "equilibrium-adjustment theory," for example, Orin
Kerr ambitiously sought to find a unifying theory to make sense of the
"byzantine patchwork" of Fourth Amendment cases. 23 In Kerr's view,
the Supreme Court responds to "changing technology or social practice"
by "adjust[ing] the level of Fourth Amendment protection to try to restore the prior equilibrium." 24 Kerr claims that his theory "explains what
judges do when they apply the Fourth Amendment ... and explains a
great deal of how Fourth Amendment law came to look as it does." 25
Kerr's analysis, however, is primarily focused on searches; he spends
little time trying to explain seizure doctrine, and close analysis of the

21.
See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15-21 (2012) (including some discussion of seizures but principally focused on privacy, searches, and surveillance); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE
NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 22, 38-39 (2007) (advocating a
more nuanced and precise scale of suspicion to better calibrate and balance Fourth Amendment
interests but acknowledging focus on "regulating physical and transaction surveillance"); Shima
Baradaran, Rebalancing the FourthAmendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 42 (2013) ("Most Fourth Amendment cases balance the need for effective law enforcement against an individual's . .. [right to]
privacy."); Orin S. Kerr, FourModels of Fourth Amendment Protection,60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506-

07, 508 n. 16, 528 n. 123 (2007) (explaining that the article analyzes the four dominant models of
defining what a "reasonable expectation of privacy" means in the context of Fourth Amendment
searches and clarifying that seizures are beyond the scope of the article); L. Song Richardson, Arrest

Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2040 (2011) ("The [Fourth]
Amendment is primarily concerned with protecting individual privacy against arbitrary government
intrusion."); cf Jed Rubenfeld, The End ofPrivacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104-05 (2008) (advocating focus on security instead of privacy, focusing on wiretapping and enemy combatant detentions).

22. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494-95 (2014) (warrantless search of cell
phone incident to arrest held unconstitutional); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965-66 (2013)
(DNA swabbing of arrestees held constitutional); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012)

(warrantless GPS tracking held unconstitutional); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)
(warrantless use of thermal heat imager held unconstitutional).
Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
23.

REV. 476, 479-80 (2011) [hereinafter Kerr, Equilibrium] (describing the "dynamic" of "equilibrium
adjustment" as means of reconciling conflicting Fourth Amendment cases); see also Orin S. Kerr,
Response, Defending Equilibrium-Adjustment, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 84, 90 (2011) [hereinafter
Kerr, Defending] (explaining that one goal with the equilibrium theory "was to rescue Fourth
Amendment law from this anarchic narrative").
24.
Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 480.
25.
Kerr, Defending, supra note 23, at 90.
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Court's recent seizure cases does not reveal any pattern of equilibrium. 26
The Court's seizure cases over the last fifteen years instead demonstrate
a relatively consistent expansion of government seizure authority.27
So the protection against unreasonable seizures, although clearly
understood by the Court to be a fundamental liberty protection, continues
to be a neglected sibling. 28 In this way, little has changed since 1982,
when Richard Williamson described the Court as "preoccupied with the
task of defining the nature and scope of the individual privacy right secured by the amendment." 29 Scholars have also given the interests in
liberty, freedom of movement, and autonomy-which are implicated by
unlawful seizures-too little attention."
This emphasis on searches by courts and scholars is only problematic if searches and seizures are different from each other in meaningful
ways. They are. Seizures always involve restraining the movement of the
person being seized.3 1 Whether briefly at a checkpoint or, at the other
end of the spectrum, as the function of a formal custodial arrest, seizures
implicate fundamental liberty interests in bodily integrity and freedom of
movement. 32 The government's corresponding interest in seizure cases
always includes, but is not limited to, the need to restrain the movement
of the person being seized for some period of time.
Part I of this Article documents how Court decisions in the last fifteen years have expanded the definition of a "reasonable seizure." This
has occurred for every category of seizures of people: arrests, stops,
26.
See Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 481, 521-22 (describing Fourth Amendment
events that can be explained by equilibrium-adjustment, asserting that the law of arrests has not
changed, and asserting how the Court's automobile cases (including traffic stop decisions) reflect
acclimation to automobile as new technology).
27.
See infra Part I. Although Kerr views technology as a force driving his perceived equilibrium, it operates differently in the seizure context. As outlined below, changes in technology have a
greater potential to weaken government claims of need in the seizure context. See infra Section

III.D.
28.
Richard A. Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of "Stop" and "Arrest," 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 771, 771 (1982) (describing "the law governing seizures of people" as the
"stepchild of fourth amendment jurisprudence").

29.

Id.

30.
Williamson's article is a notable exception. See id. Tracey Maclin's work includes others.
See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters" - Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth

Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 249-50 (1991) [hereinafter
Maclin, Encounters]; Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The FourthAmendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1328-30 (1990) [hereinafter Maclin, Locomotion]
(describing the Court's shift away from recognition of fundamental Fourth Amendment "rights of
personal security and locomotion"). There are, of course, other thorough analyses of specific types
of seizures that are discussed throughout this Article and particularly in Part 1. The literature, however, has too few analyses of seizures collectively.

31.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures'

of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime'arrests' in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.").
32.
See infra Part II.

33.

See infra Section III.A.
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search warrant seizures, checkpoints, encounters, and police use-of-force
cases.
Part II focuses on the first part of the Fourth Amendment balance:
the individual interests that are implicated by a seizure. This part details
both the nature of the interests that are implicated and the costs (both to
individuals and to the community) of unlawful seizures. This part also
highlights why an analysis of seizures (uncoupled from search doctrine)
is necessary.
The counterweight in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness balance-the government's need to seize-is the focus of Part III. There, I
analyze four categories of problems with the Court's evaluation and calculation of necessity in seizure cases: (i) the Court's failure to press the
government to articulate the need for a particular seizure; (ii) the Court's
unwillingness to use existing laws, guidelines, or norms to evaluate
claims of necessity; (iii) the Court's silence about the impact of overcriminalization on the government's seizure power; and (iv) the Court's
reluctance to consider alternative approaches, developing technologies,
and long-term impacts in calculating necessity.
In making this critique-that the Court must play a more assertive
role in evaluating the strength of the government's asserted interests or
needs-I join a chorus of other scholars who have made that point about
the Fourth Amendment generally. 34 My contribution to this discussion is
to focus on and isolate the seizure-specific aspects of this problem and to
begin to identify proposals that would ensure a more robust necessity
inquiry in cases involving seizures of people.
I. SEIZURES OF PEOPLE: AN OVERVIEW OF AN EXPANDING POWER
The law governing when and how the government can "seize" individuals who are suspected of committing crimes is rooted in the Constitution. Stripped of those passages that focus on searches, the Fourth
Amendment provides "the people" with "[t]he right . .. to be secure in

34.
See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 21, at 44 (asserting that-at least in cases "outside the
home"-justices have "abandoned" their Fourth Amendment obligations and, instead, prioritize
"police convenience"); SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 21, 42-43 (advocating more rigorous Fourth
Amendment balancing according to the "proportionality principle"); Baradaran, supra note 21, at 7
(proposing a new Fourth Amendment model of "informed balancing" to address the court's problematic reliance on "blind balancing"); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth
Amendment "Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1686-87 (1998) (describing the Court's
approach to reasonableness balancing as "relaxed and deferential"); Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness
with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MiSS. L.J. 1133, 1137
(2012) (advocating for "more stringent" reasonableness balancing in Fourth Amendment cases);
Nadine Strossen, The FourthAmendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the

Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1176 (1988) ("[The Court] regularly
undervalues the fourth amendment interests jeopardized by every search and seizure, while overvaluing the countervailing law enforcement interests.").
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their persons . . . against unreasonable . .. seizures."35 The word "seizure" in the Amendment includes two very different concepts: the seizure of people, which is the focus of this Article, and the seizure of
"houses, papers, and effects," which is not.36 A broad spectrum of police
conduct-ranging from full-blown custodial arrests to street stops to
brief detentions at checkpoints-will meet the Court's definition of a
*
37
seizure of a person.
Although scholars like Orin Kerr describe the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as maintaining a steady balance of
power between the state and the individual, 38 the Court's seizure casesand, in particular, its twenty-first century seizure cases-do not fit that
model. Decisions issued by the Supreme Court since 2000 have broadly
expanded the government's power to seize people. The Court decided
twenty-eight cases that relate to the seizure of a person during that fifteen-year window. 39 In twenty-two of those twenty-eight cases, the Court
ruled in favor of the government, solidifying existing seizure authority
and expanding the government's ability to arrest, stop, or otherwise detain individuals. 40 The government's overall success is probably understated by these numbers. As explained in more detail below, two of the
decisions against the government, Floridav. J.L. 41 and City of Indianap35.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").

36.

See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584-85 (1980) ("The simple language of the

Amendment applies equally to seizures of persons and to seizures of property."). This Article will
often refer to "seizures of people" simply as "seizures." References to seizures of property or evi-

dence will be explicitly identified.
37.
See infra Sections I.A-I.F.
38.
See, e.g., Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 480 (explaining equilibrium-adjustment
theory).
39.
This volume of seizure cases is, by itself, remarkable. In the ten years preceding (199099), the Court heard only eight cases involving seizures of people. All of these cases (the cases
decided since 2000 and those decided from 1990-99) were located by running Westlaw searches for
the terms "Fourth Amendment" and "seizure." (Other more targeted searches were also run.) The
cases that were a "hit" for those search terms were reviewed by the author and by two research
assistants before being counted in these numbers.
40.
The twenty-two seizure cases decided in the government's favor include: Heien v. North

Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014); Plumhoffv. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014); Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011); Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S.
323 (2009); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008); L.A. Cty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007);
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005); Illinois v. Caballes, 543
U.S. 405 (2005); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146
(2004); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004); Illinois v. Lidster, 540
U.S. 419 (2004); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194
(2002); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), recededfrom by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223
(2009); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318
(2001); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001); and Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
Six seizure cases were decided against the government during this period. They include: Rodriguez

v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015); Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013); Brendlin v.
California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003); City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); and Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
41. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
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olis v. Edmond,4 2 were significantly scaled back by later Court decisions
(Navarette v. California43 and Illinois v. Lidster," respectively) during
the same time period. The government's "loss" in Bailey v. United
States 4 5 is similarly offset by the Court's earlier decision in Muehler v.
Mena.46

In the search context, by contrast, there are several recent cases
where the Court has notably restrained the government's power. Riley v.
California,47 Florida v. Jardines,48 United States v. Jones,49 and Arizona

v. Gant50 are ready examples.
The following sections provide a brief outline of the law in each of
these seizure categories: arrests, stops, search warrant seizures, checkpoints, "consensual" seizures, and police use of force. The focus is, in
particular, on Supreme Court decisions and other developments since the
turn of the century that illustrate this expansion of the government's
power.
A. PolicePower to Arrest
1. Background: Endorsing Warrantless Arrests
The Framers clearly understood seizures of persons to include formal, custodial arrests. 5 ' The requirement that police must have probable
cause to arrest criminal suspects is perhaps the hardest and fastest Fourth

42.
43.
44.
45.

531
134
540
133

U.S. 32 (2000).
S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
U.S. 419 (2004).
S. Ct. 1031, 1042-43 (2013) (holding that Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692

(1981), did not justify the detention of occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises
covered by the search warrant). On remand, the Second Circuit upheld Bailey's conviction finding
that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Bailey and that statements and evidence obtained
during the initial part of the stop were properly introduced against him at trial. See United States v.

Bailey, 743 F.3d 322, 345-46 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding Fourth Amendment violation only when officers handcuffed Bailey and that introduction of his subsequent statements was improper but resulted
only in harmless error).

46.

544 U.S. 93, 102 (2005) (finding plaintiffs detention in handcuffs during execution of

search warrant for two to three hours was reasonable in light of government interests; plaintiff was
not a suspect and was not the target of the search).

47.

134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (holding warrantless search of arrestee's cell phone was

unconstitutional).

48.

133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417-18 (2013) (bringing drug dog to suspect's porch to sniff front door

was a Fourth Amendment "search").

49.

132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding installation of GPS tracker onto suspect's car was a

Fourth Amendment "search").
50.
556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (narrowing circumstances justifying search incident to arrest of
automobile).
See Akhil Reed Amar, The FourthAmendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30
51.
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 69 (1996) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment (and its sister provision
in the Massachusetts state constitution) specified seizures of "persons" to highlight the "heightened
sensitivity government should show" when "bodily arrests" were involved and citing Wilkes and
Entick as "paradigm cases" that influenced the framers and noting that both involved "bodily arrests").
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Amendment rule.52 Until relatively recently, it was a rule without any
real exception.53
Arrest warrants, however, are not usually required. The Supreme
Court's 1976 decision in United States v. Watson5 endorsed the "ancient
common-law" rule that a warrant is not required for any felony arrest that
occurs in public and which is supported by probable cause.55 Warrantless
arrests for misdemeanors committed in the officer's presence are also
permitted.56
The Court recognized in Watson and in Gerstein v. Pugh57 "that
maximum protection of individual rights could be assured by requiring a
magistrate's review of the factual justification prior to any arrest."5 The
cost of requiring arrest warrants, however, was viewed by both the Watson and Gerstein Courts as "an intolerable handicap for legitimate law
enforcement."59 Although the Watson Court counseled that seeking an
arrest warrant would be, where "practicable," the "wise" course, in prac-

52.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (holding that the probable cause standard applies to all arrests). As the Court explained in Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629 (2003), as of
2003, the Court "[had] never sustained against a Fourth Amendment challenge the involuntary
removal of a suspect from his home ... absent probable cause." (quoting Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S.

811, 815 (1985)).
The difficulty of quantifying probable cause, of course, means that even this core component of the rule is hardly fixed. Compare Sherry F. Colb, Probabilitiesin Probable Cause and Beyond: Statistical Versus Concrete Harms, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 71 (2010) ("We do not
know exactly what the phrase 'probable cause' means, in strict numerical terms."), with Andrew E.
Taslitz, Foreword, The Death ofProbable Cause, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, ii (2010) (explaining
that "for several decades, most judges understood probable cause's quantitative requirement to hover
around a preponderance of the evidence," but asserting that the Court's recent decisions reflected a

lower probability).
53.
See discussion of material witness arrests infra Section I.A.3. It is perhaps more accurate
to state that the rule has not had any lawful exception. For details about a long-term, unlawful practice in Detroit of arresting and detaining for "hours or even days" witnesses to homicides, see Pam
Belluck, Detroit Police Case Wide Net Over Homicide 'Witnesses,' N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/ ll/us/detroit-police-cast-wide-net-over-homicidewitnesses.html?pagewanted=all (explaining that "[tihe law is clear" that "police cannot arrest"
witnesses, but documenting dozens of reports (and eventual lawsuits) for witnesses detained by

Detroit police).
54. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
55.
Id. at 418, 421, 422-23 (observing that the common-law rule had "survived substantially
intact" at both the state and national level). According to Wayne LaFave, by 1965 (a decade before
Watson), it was "routine [for officers] to make arrests without [a] warrant," and even when warrants
were sought, "judicial participation ... [was] infrequent and . . . perfunctory." WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 15-16 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965).

56.
57.
58.
59.

See Watson, 423 U.S. at 422-23.
420 U.S. 103 (1975) (preceding United States v. Watson by one year).
Watson, 423 U.S. at 417; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975).
Watson, 423 U.S. at 417, 423-24 (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113-14) (stating that

even if the Court might prefer that officers obtain warrants, "we decline to transform this judicial
preference into a constitutional rule when the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long
been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather than to encumber criminal
prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, whether it
was practicable to get a warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like").
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tice this is rarely done. 6 0 For arrests inside a suspect's home, however,
the Court has required that the government obtain a warrant.
2. Permitting Custodial Arrests for Minor Offenses
In the decades following Watson, the government's power to arrest
criminal suspects otherwise remained relatively stable.62 Since the turn of
the century, however, the Court has decided several important casesincluding Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,63 Virginia v. Moore,6 and Ashcroft v. al-Kidd6-that
have effectively expanded the power of the police to arrest criminal suspects.
Twenty-five years after Watson, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
the Supreme Court turned its attention to the question of the reasonableness of arrests for "very minor" offenses.66 In Atwater, the majority held
that a police officer's decision to take the plaintiff into custody for a seat
belt violation (her children were not properly seat belted) was constitutional. This was true even where (i) the violation was punishable only
by a fine and (ii) the record indicated that the officer's subjective intention was "gratuitous humiliation[]" of the arrestee.68
The Atwater Court purported to weigh the government's interest but
without real scrutiny of the need to take low-level offenders like Atwater
into custody. In fact, the Court ultimately rejected the idea that the government should have to make any specific showing:
[A] responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by
standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for constitutional review.... Courts attemptId at 423-24 (noting that officers' "judgments about probable cause [to arrest] may be
60.
more readily accepted where backed by a warrant").

61.

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (holding that warrantless arrests in the

home are "presumptively unreasonable").
62.
Cf Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 521-22 (following discussion of Watson, Kerr
notes that "[tihe basic facts of an arrest by a government agent for a felony are the same today as
they were at common law," and accordingly "the law of arrests has remained the same"). But cf
Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutesan "Arrest" Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?,

48 VILL. L. REv. 129, 157-66 (2003) (describing confusion resulting from the Court's shifting
approach to defining the line between a stop and an arrest).

63.

532 U.S. 318, 340, 354-55 (2001) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit

warrantless custodial arrests for minor offenses).
64.
553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (establishing "that warrantless arrests for crimes committed in
the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution" even where state law
prohibited arrest for that offense).

65.

131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084-85 (2011) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation for the plain-

tiff's arrest and two-week detention under the Material Witness statute).

66.

Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.

67.
Id. ("If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a
very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest
the offender.").
68.
Id. at 346-47 ("[T]he physical incidents of arrest were merely gratuitous humiliations
imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment.").
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ing to strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment balance thus credit the
government's side with an essential interest in readily administrable
rules.

69

The Atwater Court was reluctant to impose on officers in the field a
new judicially drawn line between fine-only offenses and those punishable by any term of imprisonment.70 This suggested a possible exception
to the new Atwater rule. What if the rule forbidding arrests for fine-only
offenses was a legislative directive? Several years later, in Virginia v.
Moore, the Court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation
even when the decision to effect a custodial arrest directly contravened a
state law requiring police to issue a summons for the particular infrac71
tion.
The Atwater Court expressed doubt that there was any meaningful
proliferation of custodial arrests for minor offenses.72 In fact, however,
misdemeanor arrests and prosecutions around the country were rapidly
climbing.73 Recent data from New York City document high numbers of
arrests and prosecutions for "quality-of-life" offenses (including, e.g.,
gambling, loitering, making graffiti, disorderly conduct, and riding a bike
on the sidewalk).74 Even before Atwater was decided, scholars observed
this phenomenon. In the wake of Eric Garner's 2014 death, critics have
asked why police would use force to subdue a person suspected of selling
untaxed cigarettes.76 Evidence of so much aggressive policing of misde69.
Id. at 347 (citation omitted) (first citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35
(1973); then citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)).
70.
Id.
71.
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008).
72.
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353 (acknowledging that there were likely other examples of "comparably foolish, warrantless misdemeanor arrests" but expressing confidence that "the country is not
confronting anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests").
73.
See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, ManagerialJustice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 611, 630 (2014) ("Between 1993 and 2010 the number of misdemeanor arrests [in New York

City] almost doubled."); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320 (2012)
(highlighting a 2009 report from the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers "estimating
that approximately 10.5 million nontraffic misdemeanor prosecutions occur nationally per year
based on the extrapolation of caseload statistics collected from twelve states in 2006" compared to
the "1 .1 million persons convicted of a state felony and approximately 58,000 federal felony cases
filed in the nation's largest urban counties" during the same year).
74.
N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., A REPORT ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE
NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES 2, app. J-1 fig.20 (2013)
[hereinafter
OAG
ARREST
REPORT),

http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAGREPORTONSQF_PRACTICES NOV 2013.pdf (documenting
high rates of quality-of-life arrests in NYC from January 2009-December 2012).
75.

See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race,

and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 462, 476 (2000) (documenting an
increase in the number of people arrested for low-level offenses as well as an increase in the numbers of those cases that were dismissed (i.e., a decrease in the quality of the arrests)); Debra Livingston, Police Discretionand the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New

Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 590 (1997) (noting that in New York City, "quality-of-life enforcement has been aggressively pursued by police executives invoking the Broken Windows idea"
and predicting eventual community alienation).
76.
See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text; see also John Marzulli et al., NYPD No. 3's
Order to Crack Down on Selling Loose Cigarettes Led to Chokehold Death of Eric Garner, N.Y.
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meanors and quality-of-life offenses suggests that the Court's assumptions in Atwater about the lack of abuses ought to be revisited.
3. Arresting Criminal Suspects as Material Witnesses
The traditional arrests described above require that police have
probable cause to believe that the arrestee committed a crime.77 What
ability do law enforcement officers have to arrest criminal suspects if
their suspicion does not rise to the level of probable cause? The answer
traditionally found in criminal procedure treatises and law school casebooks would have been none. But in most criminal procedure casebooks
now, that black letter proposition is accompanied by an asterisk or qualified by a note about the federal Material Witness Statute78 : explaining
how it operates, documenting its use to arrest and detain terrorism suspects, and citing the Supreme Court's 2011 decision in Ashcroft v. alKidd.79
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd was the first and only Supreme Court case challenging the government's post-9/11 use of the Material Witness Statute.80
The statute permits the arrest of individuals who have information that is
"material in a criminal proceeding ... if it is shown that it may become
impracticable to secure [their] presence . . . by subpoena." 8 The statute
has been interpreted broadly, allowing the arrest of witnesses to ongoing
grand jury investigations as well as trial witnesses. 8 2 The heart of Abdullah al-Kidd's claim was that former Attorney General John Ashcroft had
instituted a department-wide policy to use the federal Material Witness
Statute pretextually to detain criminal suspects on less than probable
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 7, 2014, 2:30 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/wifeman-filmed-chokehold-arrested-article- 1.1893790; George F. Will, Editorial, Eric Garner, Criminalized to Death, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2014, at A21 ("Garner died at the dangerous intersection of
something wise, known as 'broken windows' policing, and something worse than foolish: decades of
overcriminalization."). In his editorial, Will quotes Professor Stephen Carter who observed that:
It's unlikely that the New York Legislature, in creating the crime of selling untaxed cigarettes, imagined that anyone would die for violating it. But a wise legislator would give
the matter some thought before creating a crime. Officials who fail to take into account
the obvious fact that the laws they're so eager to pass will be enforced at the point of a
gun cannot fairly be described as public servants.

Will, supra.
77. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2012) ("Release or detention of a material witness.").
79.

131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); see, e.g., RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE 134 (3d ed. Supp. 2014) (citing al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, and noting the case presented
"an unusual context in which the arrest power may exist even without probable cause to believe the
arrestee has committed an infraction, much less a crime"); YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 352-53 (13th ed. 2012) (citing al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074; United States v.
Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003)).
80.
al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079.

§ 3144 ("Release

or detention of a material witness").

81.

18 U.S.C.

82.

See Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 49-62 (providing detailed analysis of legislative history to

support determination that 18 U.S.C. § 3144 applies to grand jury witnesses); see also Lauryn P.
Gouldin, When Deference is Dangerous: The JudicialRole in Material-Witness Detentions, 49 AM.

CRIM. L. REV. 1333, 1346-47 (2012) (analyzing legislative history and scholarly critiques of application of statute to material witnesses).
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cause. 8 Al-Kidd's journey to the Supreme Court focused public attention
on the government's novel and highly controversial use of the Material
Witness Statute as an investigative detention tool.M In the years following September 11, scores of material witnesses were detained in maximum-security facilities for extended periods while their alleged connections to various terrorist plots were investigated.85 Many were never
called to testify before the grand jury (or in any other criminal proceed-86
ing).
In media reports and in amicus briefs, government officials emphasized that the power to detain suspects as material witnesses was an essential counterterrorism tool.87 This claim of necessity was not tested by
the al-Kidd Court, however. Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court unanimously held that Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity because he
had not violated a clearly established law.88 A majority of five Justices
also rejected al-Kidd's claim against Ashcroft on the merits, refusing to
invalidate the warrant solely on al-Kidd's assertion of prosecutorial pretext.89 In other words, when provided with an opportunity to prohibit the
government from using the Material Witness Statute to detain criminal
suspects, the Court declined to do so. Although the Court did not explicitly authorize the use of the Material Witness Statute as an investigative
detention tool, the decision in al-Kidd implicitly facilitated the continued

83.
84.

al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079.
Gouldin, supranote 82, at 1336-37.

85.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS To ABUSE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER THE
MATERIAL
WITNESS
LAW
SINCE
SEPTEMBER
11,
at
1-3
(2005),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0605_0.pdf. In a September 2014 Report, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) suggested that the statute had been used to
detain fewer than 100 material witnesses in international terrorism cases since September 2001. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT'S USE OF THE
MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE WITH A FOCUS ON SELECT NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS 14 (2014)
[hereinafter OIG REPORT], https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2014/sl409r.pdf. OIG noted that this
"represented a tiny fraction of [its] . . . overall use." Id. at v. The statute is used regularly in immigration and human trafficking cases and, from 2000 to 2012, over 58,000 material witnesses were
arrested by the federal government. Id. at 1, 13.
86.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 85, at 2.
87.
Gouldin, supra note 82, at 1335-36, 1345 (collecting statements made by former Attorneys General, former White House Counsel and former United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York in support of the use of the statute to detain terrorism suspects).
88.
The Court explained that "[q]ualified immunity gives government officials breathing
room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions." al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at
2085. Qualified immunity for Ashcroft was appropriate because "[a]t the time of al-Kidd's arrest,
not a single judicial opinion had held that pretext could render an objectively reasonable arrest
pursuant to a material-witness warrant unconstitutional.". Id. at 2083. Justice Ginsburg concurred in
the judgment stating that "no 'clearly established law' renders Ashcroft answerable in damages." Id
at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor also concurred "that Ashcroft did not violate
clearly established law." Id. at 2089 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Kagan recused herself. Id

at 2085 (majority opinion).
89.
See id at 2085 ( "[A]n objectively reasonable arrest and detention of a material witness
pursuant to a validly obtained warrant cannot be challenged as unconstitutional on the basis of allegations that the arresting authority had an improper motive."). Whether al-Kidd had "concede[d]"
the validity of the warrant for purposes of his suit against Ashcroft (or more broadly) was the subject
of disagreement among the Justices and prompted several concurrences. See id. at 2083 & n.3.
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use of the statute in this way, effectively broadening the government's
seizure power. 90
To be fair, the questions presented to the al-KiddCourt were limited
in scope, and as Justice Kennedy explained in his concurrence, the
Court's decision left "unresolved whether the Government's use of the
Material Witness Statute in this case was lawful." 91 That issue continued
to be litigated in the district court and at the Ninth Circuit until December of 2014 when an out-of-court settlement of the lawsuit was announced.92
Material witnesses are a very narrow category of federal arrestees,
and the power to arrest material witnesses may for now be dormant-on
reserve until the next emergency.9 3 Nevertheless, as outlined in Part III, it
is another example of an expansion of seizure power that seems to have
resulted from (or been facilitated by) problems with the Court's evalua**
tion of necessity in seizure
cases. 94
Although an arrest is the "quintessential[]" Fourth Amendment seizure of a person,95 the definition of a seizure developed by the Supreme
Court over the last five decades includes other less intrusive restraints on
movement that are briefly addressed in the following sections.
B. Stopping Power
Until 1967, if an individual was not actually arrested by police,
courts did not generally find that a Fourth Amendment seizure had oc-

See OIG REPORT, supra note 85, at 77 ("Under the [al-Kidd] Court's Fourth Amendment
90.
analysis, if detention can be objectively justified by the need to secure the witness's testimony, it
does not matter if the subjective intent of the relevant officials was something else, such as to detain
the individual pending the development of probable cause to arrest him.").

91.

al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

92.
In al-Kidd's Bivens action against the FBI agents who effected his arrest, the District
Court of Idaho granted al-Kidd summary judgment, finding that al-Kidd's detention did not comply

with the requirements of the statute. See al-Kidd v. Gonzales, No. 1:05-CV-093, 2012 WL 4470782,
at *1, *6 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 2012). The government's appeal of that decision was pending before
the Ninth Circuit when the case was settled. See Richard A. Serrano, Muslim American Caught Up

in

Post-9/11

Sweep

Gets an Apology,

L.A.

TIMES

(Feb.

14,

2015,

5:00

AM),

Al-Kidd
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-detainee-apology-20150214-story.html#page=1.
received $415,000 and an acknowledgment from Wendy J. Olson, the U.S. Attorney for the District
of Idaho, that fell short of an actual apology (despite the Times headline). Id. Olson wrote that "[tihe
government acknowledges that your arrest and detention as a witness was a difficult experience for
you and regrets any hardship or disruption to your life that may have resulted from your arrest and
detention." Id. (quoting Letter from Wendy J. Olson, U.S. Attorney, to Abdullah al-Kidd (Jan. 15,

2015)).
OIG found that the use of the statute to detain material witnesses in connection with
93.
terrorism investigations was "concentrated in the 2-year period immediately following the September II attacks" and that no witness had been detained in an international terrorism investigation
since 2004. OIG REPORT, supranote 85, at 65-66.

94. See infra Part Ill.
95. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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96

curred. To arrest a criminal suspect, police had to have probable cause
to suspect the person of having committed a crime, 97 but no suspicion
was required for lesser police encounters (which included, for example, a
police officer approaching an individual to request information)."
1. Terry and its Recent Progeny
The Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Terry v. Ohio made clear
that street "stops"-ever after deemed Terry stops-were Fourth
Amendment seizures even though the intrusion on individual rights fell
short of a full-blown custodial arrest." Cognizant of the realities facing
street-level law enforcement, the Terry Court declined to require either
probable cause or a warrant for the stop (and frisk) that were the focus of
the case. Although Chief Justice Warren, who authored the majority
opinion, carefully avoided explicitly defining the requirements of a
3
"stop,"1"
Justice Harlan, in his oft-quoted concurring opinion, set out the
reasonable suspicion standard for which the case would come to be
known.' 0 As Justice Harlan explained, because a stop is a lesser Fourth
Amendment intrusion, less suspicion is required.1 02 After Terry, a stop is
justified if a police officer has a reasonable or "articulable suspicion"
that "criminal activity may be afoot." 03 Terry is equally well-known for
deeming a "frisk" to be a Fourth Amendment event. A Terry friskwhich is something less than a "full-blown search"-is justified if an
officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person he or she has stopped is
armed and dangerous.'0" Although stops and frisks, like their search and

96.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (explaining (and rejecting) prior view that "the

Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers
stop short of something called a 'technical arrest"').

97.

See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (noting that prior to Terry, "the

requirement of probable cause [to make an arrest] . . . was treated as absolute").

98.

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.

99.
Id. ("It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."); see also WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 369-70 n.16 (2011) (clarifying that before Terry these
encounters were not constitutionally protected).
100.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 & n. 16 ("We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of 'detention'
and/or interrogation.").
101.
Id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and
Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court's Conference, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 749, 793-821
(1998) (documenting the shift from probable cause to reasonableness in the drafting of the Terry
opinions); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A Law

Clerk's Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 891, 895-96 (1998).
102.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 31-32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
103.
The concept of reasonable suspicion for which Terry is known is drawn from Justice
Harlan's concurrence. Terry, 392 U.S. at 31, 33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining the concept of
an "articulable suspicion less than probable cause" and concluding that Officer McFadden's "justifiable suspicion afforded a proper constitutional basis for accosting Terry, restraining his liberty of
movement briefly, and addressing questions to him"). The "criminal activity may be afoot" language
is drawn from the majority opinion. Id. at 30 (majority opinion).

104.

Id. at 19, 27.
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seizure big siblings, are often conjoined in theory and practice, the focus
of this Article is on the seizure component of the pair: the stop.
In seizure cases decided since Terry that involve something less
than an arrest, the Court has generally evaluated the government's conduct using the sort of reasonableness balancing that the Terry Court employed.105 As the Terry Court explained: "[T]here is 'no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search
10 6
[or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails."'
In Brown v. Texas, 07 decided eleven years after Terry, the Court elaborated further on how to balance reasonableness in seizure cases:
The reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest, depends "on a balance between the public interest and the
individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference
by law officers." Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty.'

08

In the nearly fifty years since Terry, the Court has significantly
broadened the definition of reasonable suspicion and narrowed both
(i) the circumstances that will be deemed a stop (instead of a mere encounter) and (ii) the circumstances that will convert a stop into an arrest
(requiring probable cause).' As outlined below, decisions issued by the
Court in the last fifteen years have continued this trend. The cumulative
effect of these decisions-pulling back from the exigency presented in
105.

See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).

106.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (alterations in original) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387

U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
107. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
108. Id. at 50-51 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878 (1975)).
109. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (holding that an individual's consent to search is voluntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have

felt free to refuse to cooperate with the police); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (holding that "under the totality of the circumstances the anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop of respondent's car" when police observed
and corroborated some of the innocent behaviors reported in the tip); United States v. Sharpe, 470

U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985) (holding that a 20-minute delay between the initial traffic stop and search
of the vehicle was constitutionally permissible); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)
(holding that the only relevant inquiry as to custody is how a reasonable man in the suspect's posi-

tion would have understood his situation); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding
that a narcotics dog "sniff test" was reasonable in a brief Terry stop situation); United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (giving examples of factors, the presence of which may
indicate that exchange with police constitutes a seizure: "the threatening presence of several officers,
the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be com-

pelled"); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (holding incriminating statements made
in custody were fruits of an illegal seizure because the application of the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of probable cause does not depend on whether an intrusion is termed an "arrest" under
state law).
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Terry, lengthening the time span and intrusiveness of Terry stops, and
moving away from requiring specificity about the offense of suspicionis readily seen in the dramatic increase in the use of stops and frisks as a
regulatory or deterrent tool to manage crime in urban communities.110
The story of the expansion of Terry in the twenty-first century includes
several important Court decisions. It is also, however, the story of police
exploiting the Court's deferential, laissez faire approach to regulating
police conduct in this context."'
2. Reasonable Suspicion: Lowering the Bar
The Court's 2000 decision in Illinois v. Wardlowll2 -finding that an
individual's flight from police in a high-crime neighborhood could justify a stop-significantly broadened the definition of reasonable suspicion. 113 Before Wardlow, the Court had held that if an individual was free
to leave or terminate an encounter with the police, she was not "seized"
under the Fourth Amendment.114 The Court's pre- Wardlow decisions
made clear that if the police did not have reasonable suspicion to subject
a person to a Terry stop, that person had a right to walk away (or otherwise terminate an encounter with police).115
The Wardlow majority, however, curiously found that the speed
with which a person exercised his right to leave an encounter could transform constitutionally legitimate behavior into articulable suspicion.' In
other words, although prior cases provided a right to walk away, the
Wardlow Court held that when Wardlow ran from police, his flight created reasonable suspicion for a stop.117 Wardlow was perhaps as notewor-

thy for what the opinion omitted or downplayed: there was no crime of
suspicion identified, it was unclear whether the officers were in unmarked cars (which is essential to determining the significance of the

110.
See Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y.C.L.U., http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data
(last visited Sep. 19, 2015) (documenting dramatic increase in stops and frisks in New York City);
see also ACLU OF ILLINOIS, STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO 3 (2015), http://www.aclu-il.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/ACLUStopandFrisk_6.pdf (providing data on stop-and-frisk practices in
Chicago; claiming that rate of stops in Chicago outpaced New York by 4 to 1).
Ill.
Frank Zimring has outlined the "basic methodology" of New York's "aggressive" street
policing: officers conduct stops and frisks "of suspicious-looking persons" and then "mak[e] arrests
for minor offenses as a way to remove perceived risks from the street and to identify persons wanted
for other crimes." FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE 118 (2012). See infra
Section IlIl.A. I for a discussion of the issues presented in the New York City stop-and-frisk litigation.

112.
113.

528 U.S. 119 (2002).
Id. at 124-25.

114.
See infra Section I.E.
115.
See infra Section I.E.
116.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 ("[U]nprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate.").
117.
Id. at 122-25. The Wardlow Court rejected the approach taken by the Illinois Supreme
Court which had held that flight was an exercise of the Royer right to leave an encounter with police
(and thus could not be a basis for reasonable suspicion). Id. at 122-23. Instead, the Wardlow Court
deemed flight "the opposite" of"going about one's business." Id. at 125.
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flight), and there was no data to support the claim that this was a highcrime neighborhood." 8
In United States v. Arvizu,l1 9 decided two years later, a unanimous
Court upheld a stop based on a combination of factors that the Court
acknowledged would have been insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion independently.1 2 0 In Arvizu, as in prior decisions, the Court emphasized the need to "give[] due weight to the factual inferences drawn
by the law enforcement officer." 1 21
More recently, in April 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision
in Navarette v. California, a case involving two brothers who were arrested and charged with felony drug charges by state authorities.122 The
central issue in the Navarette case was whether an anonymous tip from
another driver, who claimed that the defendants had attempted to drive
her off the road, was sufficient to establish the reasonable suspicion required for a lawful stop.1 23

In a split 5-4 decision, the Court held that it was.124 Navarette significantly limits the Court's earlier decision in Floridav. J.L., which held
that an anonymous tip with limited description of the suspect and no predictive elements was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a
stop.1 25 The tip in JL. was that a young, black male wearing a plaid shirt
standing at a bus stop was carrying a firearm.1 26 The Court held that the
information in the tip did not establish reasonable suspicion for the stop
and frisk of J.L.1 27
Prior to Navarette, scholars viewed corroboration of an anonymous
tip-and specifically of the criminal conduct alleged in the tip-as essential to a determination that an anonymous tip could qualify as reasonable
suspicion.1 28 After Navarette, not much is required to make an anony118.
119.

Id. at 138-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
534 U.S. 266 (2002).

120.
Id at 275-77 (permitting reasonable suspicion for stop based on officer's observation that
driver was stiff, children waved awkwardly, and car slowed at sight of officer (among other factors)).

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 277.
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686-87.
Id. at 1688-89.
Id. at 1686.
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000); see also Katie Barlow & Nina Totenberg, Su-

preme Court Gives Police New Power to Rely on Anonymous Tips, NPR (Apr. 22, 2014, 7:40 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2014/04/22/305993180/court-gives-police-new-power-to-rely-on-anonymoustips; Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Big New Role for Anonymous Tipsters, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr.

22,

2014,

9:10

PM),

http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/opinion-analysis-big-new-role-for-

anonymous-tipsters/ (observing "that the Court had added significantly to police authority to conclude that they must act because a crime is in progress").

126.
127.

J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
Id. at 274.

See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62
128.
EMORY L.J. 259, 292 (2012) (explaining that for an anonymous tip to constitute reasonable suspicion, "the predictive tip must be corroborated by police observation, which means corroboration of
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mous tip reliable enough to justify the stop of a vehicle. The Navarette
majority was satisfied that the anonymous tipster's eyewitness account
seemed to have been made roughly contemporaneously with the incident
alleged by the tipster.129 The Court assumed that most 911 callers have
awareness of "technological and regulatory developments" that "relay
the caller's phone number to 911 dispatchers."l 30 As a result, "a reasonable [police] officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice
before using such a system."l 31
It is not difficult to imagine the language that will appear in new
editions of police manuals to reflect this expanded power to detain motorists; it can largely quote the majority opinion. An anonymous tip that
alleges any of the following "dangerous behaviors . . . would justify a
traffic stop on suspicion of drunk driving": "weaving all over the roadway," "'cross[ing] over the center line' . . . and 'almost caus[ing] several
head-on collisions,"' or "driving in the median."l32 Of course, having an
officer observe any of these behaviors would immediately provide reasonable suspicion. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, described the key problem in the case:
[The officers] followed the truck for five minutes, presumably to see
if it was being operated recklessly. And that was good police
work.... But the pesky little detail left out of the Court's reasonablesuspicion equation is that, for the five minutes that the truck was being followed (five minutes is a long time), [the defendant's] driving
was irreproachable.1 33
Despite the fact that they could not corroborate the anonymous report, the officers stopped the vehicle.' 34
3. Rodriguez v. United States: Stopping Short
In its April 2015 decision in Rodriguez v. United States,1 35 the Court
ruled in favor of the defendant, strictly limiting the scope of a traffic stop
both the specific individual and the ongoing crime" (emphasis added)); see also Virginia v. Harris,

558 U.S. 978, 979, 981 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should have granted certiorari to the question of whether an officer must visually corroborate an anonymous tip of

drunk driving).
129.
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 n.1, 1689 (2014). The majority opinion
notes that the tipper had identified herself but that she was never called to testify. Id. at 1689 n.1. As
a result, the call was treated as an anonymous tip. Id.

130.
Id. at 1690.
131.
Id.
132.
Id. at 1690-91 (first and third alterations in original) (first quoting People v. Wells, 136
P.3d 810, 811 (Cal. 2006); then quoting State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 715-16 (Haw. 2004); and
then quoting State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 626 (Iowa 2001)).
133.
Id. at 1696 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Had the officers witnessed the petitioners violate a
single traffic law, they would have had cause to stop the truck, and this case would not be before us.
And not only was the driving irreproachable, but the State offers no evidence to suggest that the
petitioners even did anything suspicious, such as suddenly slowing down, pulling off to the side of
the road, or turning somewhere to see whether they were being followed." (citation omitted)).
134.
Id.
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to those steps that further the officer's "mission." 3 6 As Justice Thomas
emphasized in his dissent, the majority's decision is not readily compatible with the Court's prior Fourth Amendment cases.1 37
Rodriguez involved a traffic stop: state police officer Morgan Struble pulled Dennys Rodriguez over after Rodriguez veered onto the
shoulder of the road while driving on a Nebraska highway. 3 8 Stops for
traffic violations like the one at issue in Rodriguez are a sort of hybrid
seizure. They involve probable-cause-level suspicion of wrongdoing, but
because the detentions involved are generally "relatively brief," they are
viewed as "more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' . . . than to a formal arrest."

39

The Rodriguez stop really involved two phases. During the first
twenty minutes of the detention, Officer Struble ran a records check on
both Rodriguez and his passenger; he questioned the two men; he wrote a
warning ticket; and eventually, he returned to the men their documentation. 140 The legality of this first phase of the stop was not disputed by the
parties.
The Rodriguez Court focused on what happened next during the
continued seizure of Rodriguez (in what can be viewed as the second
phase of the stop). Although Officer Struble admitted that he "got all the
reason[s] for the stop out of the way," he declined to let Rodriguez
leave.141 Instead, he asked for "consent"l42 to walk his dog around Rodriguez's car.1 43 When Rodriguez refused, Struble ordered him to get out of
the car, and they waited for backup.'" When the second officer arrived,
five or six minutes after the first phase of the stop ended, the officers led
Officer Struble's dog around the car.1 45 The dog alerted on the second

135.
136.

135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).
Id. at 1612 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)).

Id. at 1617 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas emphasized that Illinois v. Caballes
137.
held that "conducting a dog sniff [does] not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its
inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner." Id. at 1617 (alternation in original) (quot-

ing Illinois, 543 U.S. at 408). Also, Justice Thomas cited Pennsylvaniav. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110
(1977), to support his determination that Officer Struble's decision to call for backup (and protect his
safety) was reasonable under the circumstances. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1618.

138.
139.
140.

Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1614 (alteration in original) (quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998)).
Id. at 1613.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting statement by Officer Struble) (clarifying that Struble
141.
"did not consider Rodriguez 'free to leave"' (quoting statement by Officer Struble)).
As noted in Section LE, infra, in the text accompanying notes 176-90, if a person does not
142.
have the right to refuse a police request, he cannot truly be found to have "consented" to a search or
seizure. Based on the way that the events transpired in this case, it is clear that Officer Struble did
not believe that Rodriguez had a choice about the dog sniff.

143.
144.
145.

Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1613.
Id.
Id.
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pass around the car.1" 6 During the ensuing search of the interior of the
car, the officers discovered methamphetamines.147
Reversing the Eighth Circuit, the majority held that absent reasonable suspicion the extended detention violated the Fourth Amendment.148
In support of its holding, the Court emphasized that the "mission" or
purpose of the traffic stop was completed at the end of the first phase
(when the ticket issued and the suspect's documents were returned to
him).14 9 As the Court explained:
Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the
traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's "mission"-to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related
safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of
the stop, it may "last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at]
purpose." Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the
traffic infraction are-or should have been-completed. 50
The Court cited its previous decision in Florida v. Royer'' for the
proposition that "[t]he scope of the detention must be carefully tailored
to its underlying justification." 52 The majority's decision is cause for
optimism that the Court may be willing to require the government to
defend more specific and particularized needs for a seizure.'15 This is
true even when that more rigorous scrutiny will create some tension with
the Court's seizure (and search) precedents.
C. Search Warrant Seizures
Police officers are also permitted to detain individuals, without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, when those individuals are inside
or near a place that is being searched pursuant to a validly executed
search warrant.154 This rule, known as the Summers rule, was expanded
significantly by the Court in its 2005 decision in Muehler v. Mena.'5

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1616.
Id. at 1614 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)).
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Illinois, 543 U.S. at 407).
460 U.S. 491 (1983).
Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).

153.
Tracey Maclin disagrees, cautioning that Rodriguez "does not expand Fourth Amendment
protections for motorists." Tracey Maclin, Perspectives, 100 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 17) (on file with author). In fact, Maclin argues, the case misses the opportunity to
state clearly that police questioning that is unrelated to the crime that is the basis for the stop is
"unreasonable" and thus unconstitutional. Id. at 24, 28, 33-35.

154.

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) ("[A] warrant .. . founded on probable

cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a
proper search is conducted." (footnote omitted)); see also Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031,

1034-35 (2013) (explaining the Summers rule).
155.
544 U.S. 93, 98-99 (2005) (noting that the detention in Muehlerwas "more intrusive than
that which [was] upheld in Summers").
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In Muehler, the Court held that it was reasonable for eighteen officers conducting a search warrant to detain for two to three hours, in handcuffs, four occupants of the premises being searched.1 6 Those occupants
were not the targets of the officers' investigation, and they were not otherwise suspected of criminal activity.157 The duration of their detention
and the use of handcuffs the entire time set the degree of the intrusion in
158
Muehler well apart from what the Summers decision had authorized.
The Court upheld this additional intrusion without meaningful inquiry
into the officers' need for these precautions. The purported safety-based
need to handcuff Mena rested on the fact that the two officers watching
the occupants were "outnumber[ed]."l 5 9 This safety-based need, however, was as much the product of on-site staffing allocations as anything
else: there were sixteen other officers searching the house while Mena
and the others were handcuffed.'6 The Court shied away from secondguessing the officers' allocation of resources.
In Bailey v. United States, decided in 2013, the government
sought-but the Court rejected-a further spatial expansion of Summers.162 After obtaining a warrant to search defendant Bailey's residence
for a handgun, police observed someone matching Bailey's description
drive away from the residence with another individual. 163 While one
group of officers executed the search warrant at the residence, two other
officers followed Bailey and pulled him over about one mile away from
the residence.64 The government argued-and both the district court and
the Second Circuit agreed-that Summers "authorizes law enforcement
to detain the occupant of premises subject to a valid search warrant when
that person is seen leaving those premises and the detention is effected as
soon as reasonablypracticable."'65 The Supreme Court notably rejected
that extension of the Summers rule, holding instead that Summers does
not authorize "the detention of occupants beyond the immediate vicinity
of the premises covered by a search warrant."' 66

156.
157.

Id. at 98-100.
Id. at 96.

Amir Hatem Ali, Note, Following the Bright Line of Michigan v. Summers: A Cause for
158.
Concern for Advocates of Bright-Line Fourth Amendment Rules, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483,
504 (2010) ("Had the [Muehler] Court ... balanced the totality of the circumstances-that is, both
the detention and the handcuffing together-it would have been balancing a detention that was
significantly more intrusive than that in Summers against the aforementioned law enforcement
interests."); see also Muehler, 544 U.S. at 104-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).

159.

Muehler, 544 U.S. at 103 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Id. at 110 (Stevens, J., concurring).
160.
See infra Section 111.D (challenging the government's allocation of resources as creating
161.
the "need" in Muehler).

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1040-42 (2013).
Id at 1036.
Id
United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 208 (2d Cir. 2011), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013).
Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1037, 1042.
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D. Suspicionless Checkpoints
Seizure doctrine has evolved to encompass high volumes of suspicionless stopping as well. In United States v. Martinez-Fuertel67 and in
Delaware v. Prouse,'68 the Court expressly established that checkpoint
stops (whether at permanent checkpoints or at temporary roadblocks) are
"seizures" within the Fourth Amendment.' 69 Police officers may briefly
stop individuals at checkpoints without any suspicion of criminal wrongdoing if the officers' "primary purpose" is something other than traditional law enforcement.1 70 The Court has held that "roadway safety" and
"border protection" are valid non-law-enforcement purposes for DWI
stops and immigration checkpoints respectively.171 So long as the government can articulate these sorts of regulatory goals (like highway safety and border control), the Court has permitted it to reap law enforcement
benefits in the form of drunk driving and immigration arrests when violators are detected.1 72

Once the primary-purpose condition is satisfied, the Court balances
the government's need for a particular checkpoint against the individual's liberty interest.1 7 3 The degree to which the government's checkpoint
procedures advance its interests while also minimizing the intrusion on
liberty is generally the focus of checkpoint cases.' 74 Issues like the length
167.
168.

428 U.S. 543 (1976).
440 U.S. 648 (1979).

169.
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653 ("The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated in this
case because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the
meaning of those Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting
detention quite brief."); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556, 566-67 ("It is agreed that checkpoint
stops are 'seizures' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.") (upholding warrantless stop at
permanent immigration checkpoint); see also Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450,
455 (1990) ("[A] Fourth Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.")
(upholding warrantless stop at temporary sobriety checkpoint).

170.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40-41 (2000) (holding that checkpoint to
find narcotics was invalid); see also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424-28 (2004) (holding that
stopping members of the public to obtain information about a crime they may have observed was
constitutional).

171.
172.

Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451; Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 557.
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447-48 (holding that Michigan's use of highway sobriety checkpoints did

not violate the Fourth Amendment; thereby upholding drunk driving arrests); Martinez-Fuerte,428
U.S. at 566 (holding that "stops for brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints
are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant"; affirming immigration convictions of both defendants as a result). As Ricardo Bascuas has explained, this creates
obvious opportunities for pretextual stops. Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons from the
Highway and the Subway: A PrincipledApproach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERs L.J. 719,
759 (2007) ("If criminal charges can be brought with evidence uncovered through
administrative or 'special needs' searches, those searches can provide a convenient pretext for circumventing any requirement of individualized suspicion.").

173.

Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427 ("[l]n judging reasonableness, we look to 'the gravity of the

public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest,
and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,

51 (1979))); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43 ("[I]n determining whether individualized suspicion is
required, we must consider the nature of the interests threatened and their connection to the particular law enforcement practices at issue.").

174.

Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43.
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of the stop, the location of the stop, and the limits on any questions that
are asked are part of this inquiry.175 The linchpin of checkpoint cases,
however, is whether there are meaningful constraints on officer discretion, including randomization.176
In its 2000 decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court
held that a highway checkpoint to discover illegal narcotics was unconstitutional because its "primary purpose" was the general investigation of
"ordinary criminal wrongdoing." 77 Although Edmond signaled to some
that the Court was prepared to draw meaningful limits around the use of
suspicionless checkpoints (and might revisit its prior broad ban on inquiries into officer intent), 178 the Court's decision in Illinois v. Lidster,
four years later, blurred the Edmond line between regulatory aims and
traditional law enforcement. 179 The Lidster Court held that an "information-seeking" checkpoint designed to locate possible witnesses to a
vehicular homicide had a valid purpose that set it apart from checkpoints
to stop likely perpetrators (like those at issue in Edmond). 80
E. Mere Encounters and Consent
Not every police interaction with a civilian is a Fourth Amendment
event.' 81 The Court, in its 1983 decision in Florida v. Royer, made that
clear:
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by
merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public
place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by
175.
176.

Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427-28; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450-55.
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43; see also Tracey L. Meares, The Distributionof Dignity and

the Fourth Amendment, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES
OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 125-26 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012) (describing the checkpoint
model as the "lodestar for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment" and explaining "that randomization is critical to promote the value of evenhandedness, which is necessary to promote the
goal of discretion control at the heart of Fourth Amendment reasonableness").

177.

Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40-41, 48 ("Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis check-

point program is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment.").
178.
See, e.g., Craig Bradley, The Middle Class Fourth Amendment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
1123, 1135 (2003) ("Edmond called a halt to a series of Burger Court cases that had approved of
roadblocks to apprehend illegal aliens and drunk drivers." (footnote omitted)); George M. Dery, III
& Kevin Meehan, Making the Roadblock a "Routine Part of American Life:" Illinois v. Lidster 's

Extension of Police Checkpoint Power, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 105, 113-14 (2004) (noting that "despite
the govemment's valiant efforts, the Edmond Court remained unconvinced that the narcotics checkpoints served any purpose other than the prohibited one of 'general interest in crime control,"' and
that accordingly, the roadblocks at issue "could not be justified under the Fourth Amendment without individualized suspicion" (footnote omitted) (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48)).

179.

Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427-28.

180.
Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426-27. Lower courts attempting to police the suspect/witness line
that the Court observed between Edmond and Lidster have struggled. See, e.g., Palacios v. Burge,

589 F.3d 556, 562, 564 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing, as identified in Edmond, that there are only
limited circumstances where individualized suspicion is not necessary and holding that under Lidster, where police need to acquire more information about a recent crime in the vicinity, an identification procedure may be "reasonable in context" (quoting Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426)).

181.

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983).
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putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to
such questions. Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself
as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure
82
requiring some level of objective justification.1
The distinction between a Fourth Amendment seizure and other

lesser encounters

with police was initially spelled out in Terry:

"[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his free-

dom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."' 83
The test eventually developed by the Court established that a person
is seized under the Fourth Amendment when a reasonable person in his
or her shoes would not feel "free to leave"'8 or to "otherwise terminate

the encounter."' 85 In addition, unless the suspect is physically restrained
or submits to a "show of authority" by police, the Court will not find that
a seizure has occurred.1 86

In this way, a "consensual seizure" is an impossibility. For consent
to be meaningful, a person must have the freedom to refuse to consent.
Per the Mendenhall-Royer-Bostick line of cases, however, if a person
has freedom to leave or to terminate the encounter, she is not, in fact,
seized.1 87 In other words, an individual who remains in an encounter with
police when the law determines that she has the freedom to leave or terminate an encounter cannot claim to have experienced a Fourth Amendment event.'8 For this reason, no affirmative consent is required. This is

distinguishable from the search context where officers routinely obtain

182.

Id. (citations omitted); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) ("Given the

diversity of encounters between police officers and citizens, however, the Court has been cautious in
defining the limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment on encounters between the police and citizens.").

183.
184.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ("[A] person has been 'seized'

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."); see also
Maclin, Locomotion, supra note 30, at 1299-1302 (criticizing Mendenhall-Royer free-to-leave test
and asserting that Court's embrace of common law right of inquiry (i.e., police right to stop and ask
questions of individuals on the street) significantly reduces Fourth Amendment protections and
infringes the right of locomotion).

185.
186.

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 439-40 (1991) (enlarging Mendenhall test).
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 629 (1991).

187.
Cf Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality,
Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO

L. REv. 507, 515-16 (2001) (describing the "assumption that when an individual agrees to police
requests to engage in conversation, she is not submitting to a 'show of authority' of the kind that
would convey the message that she is not free to leave" (quoting HodariD., 499 U.S. at 625)).

188.

See Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984) (describing the type "of consensual

encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest"); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35 ("We have
stated that even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent
to search his or her luggage-as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with
their requests is required." (citations omitted)).
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affirmative consent to search and where the issue then litigated is the
voluntariness of that consent.' 89

'

The Mendenhall-Royer-Bostick line of cases is controversial because the Court hypothesizes more freedom to terminate encounters with
police than most people actually feel. As Tracey Maclin explained:
"Common sense teaches that most of us do not have the chutzpah or stupidity to tell a police officer to 'get lost' after he has stopped us . . . ." 9
Even those of us who may know, as a legal matter, that we are free to
leave or terminate certain encounters with police, may not actually feel
free to do so.1 9
In decisions that attempted to address that concern, and which relied
on language from the Court's earlier decision in Bostick, the Eleventh
Circuit developed a test that arguably required officers conducting bus
sweeps to alert passengers that they were not required to comply with the
officers' requests. 19 2 As the Eleventh Circuit explained, "Absent some
positive indication that they were free not to cooperate, it is doubtful a
[bus] passenger would think he or she had the choice to ignore the police
presence."' 9 3 In its 2002 decision in United States v. Drayton,' however, the Supreme Court sharply rejected the idea that officers conducting
bus sweeps should have to advise passengers of their right to terminate
the encounter.'

189.

95

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-28 (1973) (explaining the test for deter-

mining the voluntariness of consent in search cases).
190.
Maclin, Encounters, supranote 30 at 249-50.
191.
See id; see also Steinbock, supra note 187, at 528 ("Like other constitutional doctrines,
the law of consensual encounters is hard enough for experts to decipher. Its counter-intuitive and
largely inscrutable boundaries create a conundrum for law enforcement personnel and citizens alike.
From the citizen's standpoint, uncertainty will almost surely breed compliance."); Scott E. Sundby,
"Everyman "'s FourthAmendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1794 (1994) ("An optimist who reads the Supreme Court's decisions finding
that no seizure had occurred might focus on the inherent courage to stand up to authority that the
Court presupposes in the citizenry. A passenger seated on a bus that is about to depart, for instance,
apparently is sufficiently steeped in constitutional courage that he is capable of telling gun-toting
police who have singled him out for questioning that he wishes to be left alone.").

192. United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354, 1357 (1lth Cir. 1998), abrogatedby United
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
Id. at 1357 ("It seems obvious to us that if police officers genuinely want to ensure that
193.
their encounters with bus passengers remain absolutely voluntary, they can simply say so. Without
such notice in this case, we do not feel a reasonable person would have felt able to decline the
agents' requests."); see also United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787, 790 (11th Cir. 2000) (coming to
the same conclusion as United States v. Washington), rev'd, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); United States v.

Stephens, 206 F.3d 914, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2000) (relying on Washington to hold that bus passenger
should have been advised of right to terminate encounter with officer before being asked for consent
to search).

194.

536 U.S. 194 (2002).

Id. at 207 ("[T]he Court has repeated that the totality of the circumstances must control,
195.
without giving extra weight to the absence of this type of warning."); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33, 35, 39-40 (1996) ("We are here presented with the question whether the Fourth Amendment requires that a lawfully seized defendant must be advised that he is 'free to go' before his
consent to search will be recognized as voluntary. We hold that it does not. .. . [l]t [would] be unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent
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Drayton was not the only decision in this time period that shifted
the line between an encounter and a stop. As noted above, the Court's
decision in Wardlow-which expanded the definition of reasonable suspicion to include flight from police-also served to restrict the manner in
which an individual could exercise his or her freedom to leave an encounter with police. 196
F. Excessive Force
The final category of Fourth Amendment seizure cases operates differently from the preceding categories of seizures. In all of the prior categories, the focus has been on defining the circumstances in which police
may effect seizures of varying degrees-the when question. But the
Fourth Amendment also governs the how question, regulating the force
that can be used to effect seizures that are permitted. As the Court recently reiterated in Plumhoff v. Rickard,'9 ' "[a] claim that law-enforcement
officers used excessive force to effect a seizure is governed by the Fourth
Amendment's 'reasonableness' standard." 98
The standard for use of deadly force to apprehend suspects was set
by the Court in Tennessee v. Garner'9 in 1985. The Garner Court held
that where there is no danger or threat to the officer or others, the government's interest in apprehending the individual does not justify the use
of deadly force nor does it outweigh the suspect's interest in his own
life.2 00 Where there is probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others, however, the
Court indicated that the use of deadly force would not be unreasonable. 20 1
The Court has issued two use-of-force decisions since 2000 that
have expanded on its holding in Garner. In Scott v. Harris,202 decided in
2007, the Court held that, given the high risk to bystanders, the officer's
decision to ram his vehicle into a fleeing suspect's car to end a dangerous

to search may be deemed voluntary."); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) ("While most
citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they
are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.").
For a thoughtful critique of the Court's conclusion (in the search context) that asking
police officers to advise individuals of their right to refuse to consent to a search would create "prac-

tical difficulties," see Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 869-72 (2014)
(characterizing the Court's conclusion as "highly suspect").

196.
197.
198.

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000).
134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
Id. at 2020; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) ("While it is not always

clear just when minimal police interference becomes a seizure, there can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment." (citation omitted)).

199.
200.
201.
202.

471 U.S. I (1985).
Id at I1.
Id
550 U.S. 372 (2007).
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high-speed chase was reasonable.203 The majority was quick to reject the
dissent's argument that the officers' continued pursuit of the suspect unnecessarily escalated the situation.204
In Plumhoff v. Rickard, decided in 2014, the Court held that police
firing fifteen gunshots into a vehicle (and killing the two occupants) did
205
not violate the Fourth Amendment. 2 The Court explained, relying on
Scott, that this was a reasonable use of force to end the pursuit of a fleeing vehicle because the suspect's driving posed a public-safety risk.206
These cases, relying on a case-by-case totality of the circumstances approach, have been criticized for failing to provide officers (and lower
courts) with clear guidelines about how to resolve use-of-force questions.
The question of the need for greater de-escalation of police encounters has come to the forefront in the wake of the series of highly publicized deadly force cases from 2014 and 2015.208 Although police forces
are significantly more professional (and professionalized) than they were
in the past, that has not necessarily meant that they are less aggressive.
Radley Balko argues that "as a matter of policy, police use more force
today than they have in the past. SWAT tactics, for example, are increasingly used for credit card fraud and other low-level offenses, administrative warrants, or even regulatory enforcement." 209 He advocates for
greater emphasis in "[u]se-of-force training . .. on conflict resolution and
de-escalation." 210
II. DEFINING

LIBERTY AND CONTROL

Being precise about the nature and substance of the rights implicated by an unlawful seizure is essential. As this Article makes clear, the
reasonableness of a particular seizure will ultimately turn on both the
weight of the government's need for the seizure and the possibility of

203.
Id. at 386 ("A police officer's attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that
threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it
places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.").

204.
205.
206.

Id. at 385.
Plumhoffv. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2014).
Id ("[I]t is beyond serious dispute that Rickard's flight posed a grave public safety risk,

and here, as in Scott, the police acted reasonably in using deadly force to end that risk.. .. We reject
th[e] argument [that petitioners acted unreasonably in firing fifteen shots]. It stands to reason that, if
police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the
officers need not stop shooting until the threat has ended.").

207.

Rachel A. Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1l19, 1127

(2008) (asserting that Garner, Graham, and Scott have provided limited guidance to lower courts
sorting out use of force claims).
208.
See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.

209.

Radley Balko, Five Myths About America's Police, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2014),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-americas-police/2014/12/05/35bl af44-

7bcd-1 I e4-9a27-6fdbc6l2bff8_story.html ("The problem isn't cops breaking the rules-the rules
themselves are the problem.").

210.

Id.
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protecting the government's interest in ways less intrusive than a Fourth
Amendment seizure.
Reasonableness is a relative measure and the government's interest
in effecting a particular seizure will be weighed against the individual
interests that are infringed. 211 The important task of defining the individual interests at stake in seizure cases involves two steps. The Court must
first clearly identify the nature of the rights that are infringed when a
seizure occurs. As outlined below, those individual rights are generally
defined in terms of both liberty (or freedom) and control (or autonomy).
The second step is the calculation: the Court must try to value those
rights by gauging the individual and collective costs of seizures.
A. IndividualRights
The text of the Fourth Amendment itself does not distinguish between searches and seizures: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated .... " 2 12 Nor does it differentiate between seizures of people and seizures of "houses, papers, and effects." 2 13
But the rights and liberties at issue in seizure cases differ in important
ways from those implicated by searches.2 14
The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures
of persons is, in fact, a bundle of rights and protections. The interests
infringed when a person is seized have been described as rights to "free
movement"2 15 and "locomotion,"2 16 rights to "personal security" and
"bodily integrity," 217 and rights to "personal dignity." 218 Taken together,
211.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (explaining that calculating Fourth Amendment

reasonableness requires balancing the government's "need" against the "invasion" of a particular

search or seizure (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967))).
212.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
213. Id.
214.

The needs that the government must assert to justify a seizure are different, too. See infra

Section III.A.
215.

Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or

Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 346 (1998).
216.
Maclin, Locomotion, supra note 30, at 1260-61 (describing the Fourth Amendment as
protecting a "right of locomotion" that was grounded both in the right to be free from "government
interference" and the Amendment's protection of "personal security").
217.
Clancy, supra note 215, at 346 & nn.263-69 ("In referring to protected personhood interests, it has been sometimes stated that the Fourth Amendment protects the right to be left alone,
individual freedom, personal dignity, bodily integrity, the 'inviolability of the person,' the 'sanctity
of the person,' and the right of free movement." (footnotes omitted) (quoting first Wong Sun v.

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963); then quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66 (1968))
(collecting Supreme Court cases in the footnotes); see also Davis v.
27 (1969) ("Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment
intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these
'investigatory detentions."').
218.
Clancy, supra note 215, at 346. The concept of dignity

Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726was meant to prevent wholesale
intrusions be termed 'arrests' or
has also been described as the

"inviolability" or "sanctity of the person." Id. at 346 & nn.263-69 (first quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S.
at 484; then quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 66) (collecting Supreme Court cases in the footnotes); see

also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2089 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (describing al-
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these descriptions define both an intrinsic, essential, inalienable liberty or
freedom and a means of restraining the government.2 19
In the search context, scholars like Stephen Schulhofer, Jed Rubenfeld, and Thomas Clancy have advocated characterizing the Amendment
as affording a right to control or restrict government access to information as opposed to a mere privacy protection. 220 A similar emphasis in
seizure cases on these concepts of security and control is important, but
any suggestion that we should develop a unifying, autonomy-based explanation of the interests implicated in both search and seizure cases may
be problematic. 221 In seizure cases, as noted above, the interest that is
implicated-albeit to varying degrees-is the right to control the movement of one's own body.222 Refraining that specific form of control as
some more general autonomy interest that applies similarly or equally to
searches and seizures may seem relatively harmless, but it risks-at least
in seizure cases-making the interests at stake more vague or removed.
Instead, a clearer articulation of the movement, locomotion, and liberty
rights at stake in seizure cases might highlight for the Court (or even for
law enforcement officers) alternative and less restrictive means of accomplishing the government's ends.223
With the right to control one's movement at its core, the right to be
free from an unreasonable seizure is readily distinguishable from the
property and privacy rights that are implicated by searches (or by seizures of evidence and property). 224 Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to
Kidd's ordeal as a "grim reminder of the need to install safeguards against disrespect for human
dignity, constraints that will control officialdom even in perilous times").
See Clancy, supra note 215, at 354 (asserting the Framers' focus on security reflected a
219.
desire "to exclude the government").
Stephen Schulhofer, for example, rejects the characterization of Fourth Amendment
220.
privacy as a form of secrecy and advocates replacing it with a view of privacy as a form of information control. SCHULHOFER, supranote 21, at 6-9. As Schulhofer explains, privacy defined only as
secrecy is too easily dismissed as a protection that only the guilty would need. Id. at 6. This is a
subtle shift-from emphasizing a desire to hide information to the desire to control one's information. Id. at 6-9 (explaining that Fourth Amendment privacy protection is not about "secrecy," it is
about "personal autonomy," "security," and "control over personal information").
Jed Rubenfeld and Thomas Clancy have similarly argued against a privacy-centered view
of Fourth Amendment search protections and for greater emphasis on "security." Clancy, supranote
215, at 367-68 ("[T]he ability and the right to exclude agents of the government is the essence of the
security afforded by the Fourth Amendment.... It is not privacy which may motivate a person to
assert his or her right. It is the right to prevent intrusions-to exclude-which affords a person
security."); Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 104 ("The Fourth Amendment does not guarantee a right of
privacy. It guarantees-if its actual words mean anything-a right of security.").
Thomas Clancy has asserted that "[t]o look beyond the right to exclude and seek positive
221.
attributes to the right to be secure, whether those attributes be called privacy or something else,
serves to limit-and ultimately defeat-that right." Clancy, supra note 215, at 367. Jed Rubenfeld's
desire to jettison privacy and "revitaliz[e] the right to be secure" seems to suggest a similar ap-

proach. Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 104-05.
222.

See supranotes 215-19 and accompanying text.

223.
224.

See infra Section IIl.A.
See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) ("A search compromises the individu-

al interest in privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion over his or her person or property."); see also Maclin, Locomotion, supra note 30, at 1330 (asserting that the "modern constitutional
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insist on a bright line between searches and seizures or between privacy
and personhood or movement. Searches and seizures overlap in many
cases. Indeed, the need to get the seizure analysis correct is heightened
because arrests are generally an automatic trigger for searches incident to
arrest.225 Terry stops, likewise, often lead to Terry frisks. 226 And a chal-

lenge to the evidentiary fruits of one of these seizure-triggered searches
is the most frequent means by which the lawfulness of a stop or arrest is
litigated.2 27
Nor is there a case being made here that seizures are always more
intrusive or offensive than searches. Searches of a person-for example,
frisks, pat downs, or other searches of a person's pockets; body cavity
searches; or cheek swabs for DNA-may implicate similar personhood
and dignity interests and, depending on the nature of the search, could be
dramatically more intrusive than, say, a checkpoint stop. 22 8
The point is simply that the interests implicated by a seizure of a
person are different in important ways from other Fourth Amendment
events: they always involve at least some restriction on movement that is
not inherent in a search. Precision about the interests and rights implicated by police conduct is essential to evaluating the lawfulness of the government's conduct in any Fourth Amendment case. As outlined in Part
III, in every seizure case, the Court must address whether the government can justify the restraint of a particular suspect's movements.

fascination with the right of privacy [has] obscure[d]" the importance of a "meaningful right of
locomotion"); Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 103 (explaining that "expectations of privacy do not
really speak to arrests or imprisonment-that is, to seizures of the person").

225.

See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that a search incident to

arrest authorizes extensive and thorough search of suspect's person); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 763 (1969) (authorizing search of grab area around arrestee as an incident of an arrest), abrogation recognized by Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). In many states, arrests also trigger

DNA swabs. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970-71 (2013). Custodial arrests may
also trigger intrusive searches at the jail. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 132

S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (2012).
226.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (finding frisk of a constitutionally stopped
person appropriate when the officer had reason to suspect the individual was armed).
227.
Cf Strossen, supra note 34, at 1189-90.

228.

Cf Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy

andAutonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "UnderstandingsRecognized and

Permitted by Society," 42 DuKE L.J. 727, 737-42 (1993) (analyzing results of survey that asked
respondents to rank the intrusiveness of a wide range of search and seizure categories). In a frequently quoted passage from his concurrence in UnitedStates v. Watson, Justice Powell grappled with this
question and highlighted the conflict between logic and law in the Court's approach to regulating
arrests:
Since the Fourth Amendment speaks equally to both searches and seizures, and since an
arrest, the taking hold of one's person, is quintessentially a seizure, it would seem that the
constitutional provision should impose the same limitations upon arrests that it does upon
searches. Indeed, as an abstract matter an argument can be made that the restrictions upon
arrest perhaps should be greater.

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
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B. The Cost of an UnreasonableSeizure
Being specific about the nature of the interests at stake in seizure
cases is only part of the process. Scholars have long documented the
Court's struggle to accurately measure or value the cost of a particular
Fourth Amendment intrusion, particularly when the individuals presenting the claim to the Court are either accused or convicted criminals. As
Nadine Strossen has explained, the Court's efforts to weigh the "subjective intrusiveness" of a search or seizure are "particularly dependent upon value judgments" that are regularly made without citation to "any
empirical evidence-either specific evidence regarding the reactions of
particular individuals, or more generalized evidence such as expert opinions or public opinion surveys." 229
While the Court's harm-estimation problems are common to both
search and seizure cases,230 there are reasons to think they may be amplified in the seizure context. Particularly in technology cases, Justices
seem to be better able (or at least more willing) to put themselves in the
position of the individual whose home is being surveilled,23 1 whose car is
being followed,232 or whose phone is being searched.233 There are not
similar passages to cite in recent seizure cases. Justices do not seem to
get stopped, to ride the bus, or to live in boardinghouses.
In Atwater, perhaps the seizure case most likely to strike close to
home for the Justices, the Court did acknowledge the "pointless indignity" of Atwater's arrest and confinement for a mere seat belt violation.234
As noted above, however, Atwater's experience was quickly (and inaccurately) dismissed as an anomaly.

229.
Strossen, supra note 34, at 1188; see also Baradaran,supra note 21, at 35-36.
230.
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 228, at 774 (asserting that survey data reflected a
mismatch between "commonly held attitudes about police investigative techniques" and the Court's
perceptions of the intrusiveness of those techniques and recommending further empirical studies);
see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meera Adya & Jacqueline Mogle, The Multiple Dimensions of

Privacy: Testing Lay "Expectations of Privacy," 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 339-42 (2009).
231. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001) ("The Agema Thermovision 210 might
disclose, for example, at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and batha detail that many would consider 'intimate' . . . .").
232.
At oral argument in United States v. Jones, Chief Justice Roberts famously asked the
government attorney: "You think there would also not be a search if you put a GPS device on all of
[the Justices'] cars, monitored our movements for a month?" Transcript of Oral Argument at 9,

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259).
233. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489-90 (2014) (describing cell phones as containing
"[t]he sum of an individual's private life"; observing that "it is no exaggeration to say that many of
the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of
nearly every aspect of their lives-from the mundane to the intimate"; and enumerating the types of
apps that are typically found on cell phones: "apps for Democratic Party news and Republican Party
news; apps for alcohol, drug, and gambling addictions; apps for sharing prayer requests; apps for
tracking pregnancy symptoms; apps for planning your budget; apps for every conceivable hobby or
pastime; apps for improving your romantic life").

234.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
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The Floyd litigation from the Southern District of New York highlights that, as scholars like Song Richardson and Shima Baradaran emphasize, having concrete data is transformative for parties (criminal defendants or civil plaintiffs) asserting Fourth Amendment claims.235 The
events of the last year may have brought us to a moment where the government is more willing to develop and share that data. As FBI Director
Jim Comey explained in February 2015: "The first step to understanding
what is really going on in our communities and in our country is to gather more and better data related to those we arrest, those we confront for
breaking the law and jeopardizing public safety, and those who confront
us.

,,236

The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing emphasized
the need for more data to support a "culture of transparency and accountability." 237 Indeed, in its action items, the Task Force called on law enforcement agencies to (i) "collect, maintain, and analyze demographic
data on all detentions (stops, frisks, searches, summons, and arrests)";
and (ii) publish both their department policies and "information about
stops, summonses, arrests, reported crime, and other law enforcement
data aggregated by demographics." 238
Even where data sets are hard to come by, detailed and descriptive
ethnographic accounts of the experience of those who reside in heavily
policed communities provide a clear-eyed view of the costs of aggressive
stop-and-arrest policies. In their 2013-2014 analyses of the impacts of
New York's aggressive policing on the community being policed,
Amanda Geller, Jeffrey Fagan, Tom Tyler, and Bruce G. Link found that
"young men reporting police contact, particularly more intrusive contact,
also display higher levels of anxiety and trauma associated with their
experiences."

239

In his study of forty Black and Latino boys in East Oakland, California, Victor Rios argued that police perpetuated dislocation of boys in
the community by "assuming that all the boys were actively engaged in
235.

The "hit rate" data in Floyd was essential to the plaintiffs' success in the District Court.

See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 575-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Baradaran,
supra note 21, at 8 (advocating "informed balancing [which] requires consideration of wider information contained in statistical data, clinical evidence, and experience, rather than common sense
alone"); Richardson, supra note 21, at 2040 (having data helps courts "reconsider their behavioral
assumptions about police decisionmaking and judgments of criminality").
236.
Comey, supra note 15 ("'Data' seems a dry and boring word but, without it, we cannot
understand our world and make it better.").
237.
TASK FORCE, supranote 13, at 1.

238.

Id. at 13, 24.

239.
Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men,
24 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2324 (2014); see also CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, STOP AND
FRISK: THE HUMAN IMPACT 1 (2012) ("These interviews provide evidence of how deeply this practice impacts individuals and they document widespread civil and human rights abuses, including
illegal profiling, improper arrests, inappropriate touching, sexual harassment, humiliation and violence at the hands of police officers. The effects of these abuses can be devastating and often leave
behind lasting emotional, psychological, social, and economic harm.").
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criminal and violent activity or by providing the boys little choice."24 0
Rios also observed that the experience of boys without criminal records
in his study was disturbingly similar to the experience of those with
criminal records: the boys who had not been arrested "expressed the
same feelings and experiences as the boys who had been stigmatized,
disciplined, and arrested." 24 1 Alice Goffman and Elijah Anderson have
similarly illuminated the impacts of aggressive policing on communi242
ties.
Finally, proposals for the Court to take a broader view of the interests being asserted are as important in the seizure context as they are in
search and privacy cases.243 Anthony Amsterdam cautioned, in 1974,
against the more narrow conception of the Fourth Amendment as a
"'safeguard' against violation of individuals' isolated spheres of fourth
amendment rights." 24 Instead, he advocated a "conception of the
amendment as a general command to government to respect the collective security."24s The Court's failure to account for security as a collective community right is particularly problematic in cases like Atwater,
where the Court balanced Atwater's individual complaint against the
246
As outlined in Section III.D, comneeds of police across the country.
240.

(2011).
241.

VICTOR M. RIos, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BoYS 72

Id. at 148.

242.
ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY
191-93 (1990) (describing the experiences and responses of an innocent black man who is stopped
by the police in Philadelphia, PA); see also ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN
AMERICAN CITY, at xii-xiv (2014) (chronicling her experiences with the 6th Street Boys, a group of
men "in a lower-income Black neighborhood" in Philadelphia).
243.
Baradaran, supra note 21, at 8 (advocating that courts "consider not just the criminal
defendant before them but also the constitutional rights of a broader swath of society"); Tracey
Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the Government Perspective: Whose
Amendment is it, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669, 669-70 (1988) (criticizing Court's failure "to
appreciate the implications of its rulings for persons not immediately involved in the cases before it.
Though many may consider this argument an exhausted civil libertarian protest, whenever the Court
upholds a challenged police practice against an obviously guilty individual, the Court is also licensing similar intrusions against not-so-obviously innocent persons as well."); Strossen, supra note 34,

at 1196 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1976)) (using MartinezFuerte as an example where the Court deemed the intrusion "quite limited" and failed to "take into
account the intrusiveness experienced collectively by the thousands of motorists detained at the
checkpoint each day, or the hundreds of thousands detained each week").
244.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
372 (1974); see also Strossen, supra note 34, at 1196 ("The Court's tendency to focus on individual
fourth amendment litigants also causes it to neglect systematic evaluation of the collective harm to
individual rights resulting from searches or seizures that are similar or identical to the one that gave
rise to the case.").
Amsterdam, supra note 244, at 372; see also Sundby, supra note 191, at 1777 ("I would
245.
characterize the jeopardized constitutional value underlying the Fourth Amendment as that of 'trust'
between the government and the citizenry.... Government action draws its legitimacy from the trust
that the electorate places in its representatives by choosing them to govern.").
246.
Strossen, supra note 34, at 1204 (criticizing "the Court's regular weighing of the privacy
and liberty rights of a single individual against the law enforcement interests of the collective national community"); see also Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What's "Reasona-

ble": The Protectionsfor Policing (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 16-17) (draft on file with
author) (explaining that the Court's balancing is "illusory" because "[w]hen the Court weighs the
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munity effects and interests must also be considered when weighing the
government's interests. Eventually, the consistent deprivation of individual liberties will create public-safety costs. 24 7
III. DEFINING NECESSITY
The other side of Terry's reasonableness balance-and the focus of
this final part of the Article-is the government's need for the seizure in
question. The sections that follow examine four categories of problems
with the necessity calculus in seizure cases: (i) the Court's failure to
press the government to articulate the need for a particular seizure;
(ii) the Court's unwillingness to use existing laws, guidelines, or norms
to guide its assessment of necessity; (iii) the Court's silence about the
impact of overcriminalization on the government's seizure power; and
(iv) the Court's struggle with its obligation to consider alternative approaches, developing technologies, and long-term impacts in calculating
necessity.
A. Articulating the Need to Seize
The government's need to seize an individual is often different from
its interest in conducting a search. This is why even searches of a person
(which implicate some of the same individual interests as seizures) must
be analyzed differently. The government's interest in conducting a seizure must always be justified by some need of the government to control
or restrict the movement of a person's body,24 8 while its purpose for a
search is to obtain access to information, evidence, or weapons. 249 Of
course, both of these specific, immediate interests may be in service of
general investigative, crime prevention, or other public safety aims that
are common to both searches and seizures.250

government's and individual's competing interests, it almost always compares the overarching goal
of the search scheme against a single individual's privacy interest"). This apples-to-oranges problem
was starkly presented in Atwater, where the Court acknowledged that Atwater's individual interest
"clearly outweigh[ed] anything the City [could] raise against it specific to her case." Atwater v. City
of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (emphasis added). The Atwater Court proceeded, however,
to balance her interests against the government's universal need for readily-administrable rules
across the full spectrum of factual scenarios. Id. at 347-49.
247. See infra Section III.D.2.
248. See, e.g., Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347, 354; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417
(1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1968).
249.
Cf WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 5.4(c) (5th ed. 2013) (explaining that "one primary purpose" of searches of individu-

als "is to find evidence of the crime" under investigation); Baradaran, supra note 21, at 17 (finding
that in search cases, the government's interests "include officer safety ...

public safety . . . and

judicial economy" (footnotes omitted)).
250. See LAFAVE, supra note 249, at § 5.4(c); Williamson, supra note 28, at 774 ("A seizure of
a suspected criminal, in other words, may not only serve the utilitarian function of making criminal
prosecution possible by providing a body in court against whom to prosecute the case; it also may
enhance investigatory goals by providing the opportunity to obtain evidence."); see also Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981) (describing officer (and occupant) safety as a significant law
enforcement interest driving detentions of occupants during execution of search warrants).
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At the outset of any reasonableness analysis, the Court must clearly
define the need for a particular seizure; vague assertions that a particular
arrest or stop is "necessary for effective law enforcement" are insufficient. In too many Fourth Amendment cases, involving both searches and
seizures, the Court has been imprecise about the government need at
stake. In her 2013 article, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, Shima
Baradaran explained that "effective law enforcement" was the government need or interest most often cited in Fourth Amendment search and
seizure cases.251 Baradaran and others, including Christopher Slobogin,
argue persuasively that the Court's acceptance of these overly general
and vague justifications for searches and seizures undermines the individual liberties protected by the Amendment. 252
Courts cannot defer to the sort of intuitive, gut-level calculations
that are pervasive in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.2 53 The Court's
approach seems particularly problematic in light of social science research revealing the impact of cognitive biases on police decision254
making.
Specificity and precision are particularly important when the
government interest at issue is a combination of investigative, regulatory
(deterrent), and preventive needs. 25 5
Requiring more clear statements of necessity to justify Fourth
Amendment seizures does not mean that every seizure must be adjudicated on a case-by-case, need-by-need basis. Throughout the cases re251.
Baradaran, supra note 21, at 16-17. This interest was identified in over fifty percent of the
cases that she analyzed. Id.
252.
See SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 31 (noting that the Court's efforts to make an "assessment of the invasiveness of the police action in question ... have been abysmal"); Baradaran, supra
note 21, at 20-25; see also Lee, supra note 34, at 1157; Strossen, supra note 34, at 1201 ("The
Court's tendency to inflate the governmental stake in any search or seizure is augmented by its
corresponding tendency to assume that the search or seizure will be uniquely successful in promoting law enforcement goals. This entails two separate assumptions, neither of which is supported by
judicial analysis or evidence. The first is that the challenged law enforcement method will in fact
effectively promote the law enforcement goal at issue. The second is that it will do so to a substantially greater degree than alternative law enforcement methods." (footnote omitted)).

253.

See Richardson, supra note 21, at 2052-56 (focusing on problems with police intuition);

Stoughton, supra note 195, at 849, 857 (noting that it is "common practice [for the Court] to make a
statement without citation or support" regarding "its factual assertions about policing" and describing problems with Court's intuitions). But see Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 481 (defending
"existing [Fourth Amendment] doctrine [as] complex and fact-specific" but not a "mess":
"[E]xisting [Fourth Amendment] doctrine . . . . is the product of hundreds of equilibriumadjustments made over time. Those adjustments were usually made intuitively in response to felt
necessities, but in rare cases were made out of a conscious recognition of the need for changes to
keep the law in balance in the face of new practices and technological change." (emphasis added)).
254.
See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amend-

ment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 984-87 (1999) (evaluating the role that cognitive biases play in driving law enforcement decisions). See generally Richardson, supra note 21, at 2035-36 (discussing
cognitive biases).
See Friedman & Stein, supra note 246 (manuscript at 6-7) (explaining that "the very
255.
nature of policing has shifted - from a reactive crime-solving model towards intelligence gathering,
regulation and deterrence," and emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between these categories of police behavior); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the

Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 418-20 (1988) (distinguishing between police-initiated searches and "responsive" searches).
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viewed in Part I, the Court missed opportunities to narrow entire categories of seizures and rejected litigants' proposals to draw more libertyprotective, bright-line rules. Recent decisions in Floyd, Navarette, and
Moore provide useful examples of the importance of requiring the government to articulate its need for a particular seizure.
1. The Need to Deter
The benefit of pressing the government to articulate the need for a
seizure was recently made plain in the New York City stop-and-frisk
litigation. On August 12, 2013, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern
District of New York issued a decision in Floyd v. City of New York,256
holding that the New York City Police Department's (NYPD) stop-andfrisk practices (i) violated the Fourth Amendment because they were not
based on the requisite reasonable suspicion and (ii) displayed a pattern
and practice of racial profiling in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.257 Although Floyd is not a Supreme Court case, the developments
in that litigation highlight the importance of interrogating the government's purported need for expanded seizure power.
Judge Scheindlin's decision relied heavily on data about stops that
had been gathered by the NYPD for more than a decade. 2 58 This data
showed a more than 600% increase in the number of stops over the span
of ten years: from 97,296 stops reported in 2002259 to 685,724 stops in
2011, the year the program peaked. 2 60 The data also included the number
of stops that resulted in an arrest or summons (the hit rate). 261
The class action plaintiffs relied heavily on the hit rate data to argue
that they had been stopped without reasonable suspicion.262 The dearth of
guns found during NYC frisks revealed that early, decades-old predictions about the potential for abuse of Terry had been realized.263 In de-

256.
257.

959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 540, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 562-65.

258.
Id. at 582; see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLICE PRACTICES AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN NEW YORK CITY, at ch. 5 (2000), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/nypolice/main.htm; N.Y.
STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT'S
"STOP
&
FRISK"
PRACTICES
65
(1999),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil-rights/stpfrsk.pdf
259.
Stop-and-Frisk Data, supra note 110.

260.
Second Supplemental Report of Jeffery Fagan, Ph.D. at 10, Floyd v. City of New York,
959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034). In 2012, the number of stops dropped to
532,911 and the 2013 figure was 191,558. Stop-and-Frisk Data, supra note 110. 2014 data (46,235
stops) shows that the downward trend has continued. Id; see also Mike Bostock & Ford Fessenden,

'Stop-and-Frisk' Is All But

Gone From

New

York, N.Y.

TIMES

(Sept.

19,

2014),

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/19/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-is-all-but-gone-from-newyork.html?_r-0 (explaining downward trends in stop-and-frisks).

261.
See Complaint at 10, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(No. 08 Civ. 01034).
262.
Id. at 13.
263.
See Amsterdam, supra note 244, at 438 ("The pressures upon policemen to use the stopand-frisk power as a device for exploratory evidence searches in these areas are intense. Police can
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fense of the stop-and-frisk program, the City's expert argued that the low
hit rate actually demonstrated the program's effectiveness:
With the critical shift to a mission of finding crime patterns, deploying police where and when crime is occurring before it occurs, and
reducing crime by proactive efforts to stop crime before it happens,
i.e., preventing crime, the measure of success has changed. In contrast to the definition of success used in the Fagan Report, a downward trend in the number of weapons found, and even of arrests, by
prevention standards, are evidence of success.264
In public statements defending the City's aggressive stop-and-frisk
program, former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg also emphasized deterrence as one of the driving forces behind the program:
Critics say the fact that we're 'only' finding 800 guns a year through
stops of people who fit a description or are engaged in suspicious activity means that we should end stop and frisk.
Wrong. That's the reason we need it-to deter people from carrying
guns. We are the First Preventers. 265
In other words, when pressed to justify the need for this dramatic,
exponential increase in Terry stops, and when faced with highly problematic data about racial bias in the execution of the program, the City
argued that the success of the stop-and-frisk program rested on a deterrence theory (and not on the traditional Terry justification for a stop-the
investigation, interruption, or prevention of a crime in progress).
The City's deterrence arguments have intuitive appeal (even if they
266
lack empirical support). More aggressive policing creates a greater risk
of detection that is generally expected to deter crime.267 These arguments
justify virtually any exercise of the power because these are 'high-crime' areas where all young
males, at least, are suspect." (footnotes omitted)).
264. Report of Dennis C. Smith, Ph.D. at 20, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034).
265. Michael R. Bloomberg, Mayor of N.Y.C., Address on Public Safety to NYPD Leadership
(Apr. 30, 2013) (transcript available at http://wwwl.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/15113/mayor-bloomberg-delivers-address-public-safety-nypd-leadership);
see also OAG ARREST
REPORT, supra note 74, at 2 ("The NYPD identifies stop and frisk as a tool to combat violent and
gun-related crime and deter future criminal conduct." (footnote omitted)).
266. ZIMRING, supra note 111, at 145 (concluding that, despite the beliefs of police (officials
and patrol officers) "these aggressive tactics add significant value to patrol efforts" there is, at best,
"mixed evidence of effectiveness"); see also id. at 149 ("Of all the undocumented elements of New
York City's policing changes, the marginal value to crime reduction of a variety of aggressive tactics-stops, searches, misdemeanor arrests-should be at the very top of the priority for rigorous
evaluation efforts but it isn't.").
267. The proposition that increasing the risk of apprehension increases deterrent benefits finds
support as a general matter. See VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 1 (2010),

http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/deterrence%20briefing%20.pdf ("Research to date generally
indicates that increases in the certainty of punishment, as opposed to the severity of punishment, are
more likely to produce deterrent benefits.").
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are also unconstitutional. The Court has never permitted officers (or entire departments) to justify stops as a form of general deterrence except at
checkpoints where a brief detention is "carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." 26 8 In the street-stop context, officers are required to have individualized suspicion of criminal activity that "must be measured by what the
officers knew before they conducted their search." 26 9 The Floyd case
demonstrates that, when pressed to articulate the necessity for a particular category of seizures, the government may reveal policy motives or
purposes that directly contravene the governing constitutional standard. 2 70

2. Needs Versus Interests
The Court's vagueness may, in part, be attributable to the fact that,
in some cases, the Court has described the Fourth Amendment as concerned with government interests as opposed to needs. The use of the
term "interests" seems best intended as a contrast with the inalienable
individual right it is being balanced against, not as some watered-down
version of a government need. 271 The government's power to seize-in
other words, its authority to infringe individual rights-is contingent on
identifying its need for the seizure. 27 2 Relatedly, any power given to police must be limited according to the government's clearly defined
need.273 Justice Scalia zeroed in on this distinction in the Bailey decision
268.

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). Other statements made by Mayor Bloomberg

reflected some awareness of this problem with the City's argument. In a press conference held
immediately after Judge Scheindlin issued her ruling against the City, Bloomberg described the
"vital deterrent" benefit of stop and frisk as a "critically important byproduct" of the program. Michael R. Bloomberg, Mayor of N.Y.C., Press Conference on Floyd Decision (Aug. 12, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/bloomberg-vows-appeal-federal-

judge-ruling-stop-stop-and-frisk-policy-article-1.1424630);

cf Friedman & Stein, supra note 246

(manuscript at 59) (describing the New York City program as "arbitrary" and unconstitutional because it lacked "the safeguards of deterrent policing").

269.

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000).

270.
See Friedman & Stein, supra note 246 (manuscript at 59) (explaining that the New York
City stop-and-frisk program was "not investigative policing; it [was] in terrorem deterrence").
271.
See Maclin, supra note 243, at 670 ("[T]he fourth amendment was designed not to facilitate governmental investigations, but rather to protect citizens from unjustified and arbitrary government invasions.").
272.
The original reasonableness cases consistently referred to the government's "need" for a
particular search or seizure. Quoting from Camara, which had been decided only a year before, the
Terry Court described the Court's task as "balancing the need to search (or seize) against the inva-

sion which the search (or seizure) entails." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (alterations in
original) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)). The Terry Court also
referred to the "government interest" but made clear that the interest must "justif[y] official intrusion." Id. at 21. Later cases have similarly employed this sort ofnecessity language. See, e.g., Illinois
v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (upholding search-warrant seizure where the government
articulated a "specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need" for the seizure and where "the
restraint at issue was tailored to that need, being limited in time and scope"); Maryland v. Buie, 494

U.S. 325, 333-34 (1990) (explaining that the Terry Court permitted the frisk "which was no more
than necessary to protect the officer from harm" (emphasis added)).
273.
Amsterdam, supranote 244, at 437 ("[Tihe fourth amendment is thought to tolerate [stop
and frisk] power only as the result of a fine balance between its recognized intrusion upon personal
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when he emphasized that "[c]onducting a Summers seizure incident to
the execution of a warrant 'is not the Government's right; it is an excepa rule that would otherwise render the
tion-justified by necessity-to
274
unlawful."'
[seizure]
The prospect of seizing a suspect in order to search her provides an
example. In justifying a custodial arrest, the Court should not rely on an
officer's interest in conducting incidental searches or frisks as part of the
evaluation of the necessity for custody. In the course of upholding a cus275
todial arrest in Virginia v. Moore, however, the Court explained that
"[a]rrest ensures that a suspect appears to answer charges and does not
continue a crime, and it safeguards evidence and enables officers to conduct an in-custody investigation." 27 6 The Court was vague about the kind
of "in-custody investigation" being referenced, but it reiterated shortly
afterward that custodial arrests "enable officers to investigate [an] incident more thoroughly." 277 The Court cited Wayne LaFave's thorough
treatise on arrests as support for this proposition.278
The LaFave citation does not support the idea that the desire to conduct a search incident to arrest (the search that ultimately revealed narcotics in Moore's case) could justify an arrest. Instead, in that section,
LaFave describes, but does not endorse, the practical incentives that lead
officers, who have "adequate grounds" for an arrest, to prefer to take a
suspect into custody: "[A]n arrest is commonly made when a search is
desired. Consequently, the suspect may be taken into custody under cir279
cumstances in which the risk of nonappearance would not be great."
Indeed, earlier in the book, LaFave notes that "neither courts nor legislatures have given sustained attention to ... whether the initial taking into
280
custody is necessary."

Of course, stops and arrests give the government easy access to information (through the various warrantless frisks and searches that can
accompany those seizures).28' It is not entirely clear whether the Moore
Court was including the power of police to conduct a protective search
privacy and security and its justification by a specific police need. Exercised in excess of that need,
the power makes the intrusion without the justification and destroys the balance." (footnote omit-

ted)).
Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1044 (2013) (second alteration in original) (em274.
phasis added) (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
553 U.S. 164 (2008).
275.
Id. at 173.
276.
277. Id. at 173-74.
Id. at 173 (citing LAFAVE, supra note 55, at 177-202.)
278.
LAFAVE, supra note 55, at 186-87 ("An officer who has adequate grounds may arrest a
279.
suspect to make it possible to conduct a lawful search of his person.").

280.
281.

Id. at 168.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (ex-

plaining that the majority's holding empowered officers faced with a traffic violation to "stop the
car, arrest the driver, search the driver, search the entire passenger compartment of the car including
any purse or package inside, and impound the car and inventory all of its contents" (citations omit-

ted)).
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incident to arrest of Moore as a constitutional justification for the ar282

rest.
Although a protective frisk or search may frequently operate as a
practical incentive for a police officer to conduct a stop or an arrest, these
corollary searches should not be used by the Court as a constitutionally
legitimate justification for the triggering Fourth Amendment seizure.283
3. Tying Necessity to a Specific Crime
Precedents that discourage consideration of law enforcement purposes or motives have complicated the inquiry into the need for a particular seizure. 284 After Whren, the Court has been excessively cautious
about probing the government's actual motivations for a particular seizure. 285 The Court's pretext decisions effectively write the Court out of
aiding in the solution of significant profiling problems. And they have
the potential to undermine the Court's ability to calculate government
needs: if police are not required to disclose their purposes, the Court will
be unable to tailor seizure power to the government's actual needs.
In more recent cases, the Court has relaxed the requirement that an
officer conducting a stop or an arrest must identify the crime of suspicion. That requirement was clearly articulated in the Court's 1979 decision in Brown v. Texas, where the Court emphasized that a Terry stop
should be based on reasonable suspicion that an individual is involved
with "specific misconduct." 286 Nevertheless, more recent decisions in
cases like Illinois v. Wardlow have upheld Terry stops even where officers have been silent about the crime of suspicion. 287
282.

Moore, 553 U.S. at 174.

283.
As Anthony Amsterdam explained in 1974: "When a frisk power allowed exclusively
upon the predicate that the officer needs it to protect himself from deadly assaults by a person he has
stopped for questioning becomes a motive to stop and question persons whom the officer would not
stop at all except for the opportunity to use a frisk as an evidence-gathering device, surely fourth
amendment values are seriously infringed." Amsterdam, supra note 244, at 437. The Court's decision in Whren v. United States, which permits pretextual stops, does not demand a different result
because the pretext for the search was an independently legitimate basis for the stop. 517 U.S. 806,
813 (1996) (refusing to invalidate a pretextual traffic stop that was motivated by the officers' desire
to search the car and its occupants for narcotics).

284.

Compare Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) ("[W]hether the officers had

an implied license to enter the porch [which was integral to whether there was a "search"] depends

upon the purpose for which they entered."), and City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48
(2000) (holding that the programmatic purpose of the checkpoint-traditional narcotics enforcement-was the basis for Court's finding that it was unconstitutional), with Whren, 517 U.S. at 813
("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.").

285.

See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 2082 (2011) (explaining that the

Court generally "eschew[s] inquiries into intent" because "the Fourth Amendment regulates conduct

rather than thoughts"); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (holding that an "officer's
subjective motivation is irrelevant"); see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 813-14.

286.

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49, 51 (1979); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)

(explaining that reasonable suspicion required proof of something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch"'); Friedman & Stein, supra note 246 (manuscript at 61) ("In Terry,
the stop was predicated on the perceived imminence ofa specific crime.").

287.

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-25 (2000) (holding that a Terry stop was justified

where the individual who was stopped was in a neighborhood known for heavy narcotics trafficking
and ran away from police). The Wardlow Court noted that "the determination of reasonable suspi-
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The shift from the Court's 1968 decision in Terry-where the exigency of the situation was what prompted the Court to uphold the stop
and frisk288 -to the regulatory and deterrent rationales driving current
stop-and-frisk programs also highlights this problem. 2 89 The record presented in Floyd suggested that Terry stops on this sort of general suspicion of criminality had become increasingly routine: "Between 2004 and
2009, the percentage of stops where the officer failed to state a specific
suspected crime rose from 1% to 36%."290
The Court's 2014 decision in Navarette provides another variation
on this problem. In Navarette, the anonymous tip clearly described a past
episode of reckless driving, but the caller did not allege ongoing drunk
driving. 291 Under Terry, this subtle distinction carries weight. An investigative Terry stop is clearly justified when an officer has reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity.2 9 2 An officer's power to stop an individual on reasonable suspicion that they committed a past, completed
crime is less clear.293 The Navarette majority avoided resolving this
question by finding that the anonymous tip of past conduct could have
provided sufficient reasonable suspicion for ongoing criminal activity.294
By basing that claim of reasonable suspicion on an anonymous tip that
the officers could not confirm, the majority significantly broadened the
295
definition of reasonable suspicion.

cion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior" and that the
officer was "justified in suspecting that [defendant] was involved in criminal activity, and, therefore,
in investigating further." Id. at 125 (noting that no crime of suspicion was identified).
288.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. Officer McFadden suspected that Terry and his two associates
were "casing" a store for a potential burglary or robbery. Id. at 6; see also United States v. Sokolow,

490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that a Terry stop must be investigation of
"ongoing or imminent criminal activity"); LAFAVE, supra note 249, § 9.2(c) (explaining that the
Terry decision "stressed that the officer acted 'to protect himself and others from possible danger,
and took limited steps to do so' and advocating that Terry stops "should be expressly limited to
investigation of serious offenses" (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 28)).

289.

See Nick Pinto, The Point of Order, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2015, at MMI3 ("Most people

now think of the police primarily in their role of crime fighting. But it is at least as much their other
original mandate, the prevention of disorder, that perpetuates the suspicion many hold for them.
Order is a subjective thing, and the people who define it are not often the people who experience its
imposition.").

290.

Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (these facts

were not contested by the parties).

291.

Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1690 (2014).

292.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Some argue that Terry stops should be limited to investigations
of serious crimes. E.g., Colb, supranote 34, at 1692.
293.
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, explained that the Court was left to evaluate
"whether the 911 caller's report of being run off the roadway created reasonable suspicion of an
ongoing crime such as drunk driving as opposed to an isolated episode of past recklessness."
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1690; see also id. at 1695 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The circumstances
that may justify a stop under [Terry] to investigate past criminal activity are far from clear and have
not been discussed in this litigation." (citations omitted) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S.

221, 229 (1985)). But see Colb, supranote 34, at 1692-93.
294.
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1690.
See id. at 1695 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I fail to see how reasonable suspicion of a discrete
295.
instance of irregular or hazardous driving generates a reasonable suspicion of ongoing intoxicated
driving.").
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B. The Role of Guidelines, Statutes, and Norms
This Article is intentionally Court focused in its diagnoses and prescriptions. That focus reflects enduring optimism about the role that the
judiciary can play and must play in repairing a criminal justice system
that is desperately failing in many urban communities. While other
scholars have ably suggested promising complementary legislative, prosecutorial, and departmental reforms, 296 the Court still has a fundamental
role to play in restraining aggressive police power.297 Our system is constructed on the premise that the Court can and will perform this function.298 Furthermore, the Court's missteps in some of the cases documented in this Article are partly to blame for the categorical enlargement
of seizure power.
This is not to say that state legislation and departmental guidelines
are not important mechanisms for restraining police behavior. They
clearly are, and they should play a more central role in guiding the
Court's assessment of the necessity for and the reasonableness of a particular seizure. As Anthony Amsterdam observed four decades ago, the
Court could require searches and seizures to comply with clearly articulated departmental guidelines or state laws in order to survive reasonableness challenges. 2 9 Scholars like John Rappaport, Rachel Harmon,

296.
See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 99, at 294 (explaining that "urban police forces are more
attentive to local preferences than a generation ago" but this requires investment in personnel; "Better styles of policing and less cash-strapped urban police forces are mutually reinforcing."); Russell
M. Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment: The Prosecutor'sRole, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1591, 1594-95 (2014) (arguing that prosecutors "as executive officers should refrain from introducing evidence that they conclude was unconstitutionally obtained without regard to judicial admissibility-a duty of administrative suppression"); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, I10

MICH. L. REV. 761, 768-81 (2012) [hereinafter Harmon, Policing] (describing shortcomings of
Court-focused and constitution-based solutions; advocating regulatory reforms and rigorous costbenefit evaluations of police policy); Rachel A. Harmon, PromotingCivil Rights Through Proactive

Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2009) (arguing that 42 U.S.C.

§

14141, which allows

"the Justice Department to bring suits for equitable remedies against police departments that" show a
pattern of police misconduct is underutilized, and if departments were compelled and induced to
reform, by way of this statute, departments would be motivated to proactively reform); Barry Fried-

man & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 106-09 (2015) ("Rather
than attempting to regulate policing primarily post hoc through episodic exclusion motions or the
occasional action for money damages, policing policies and practices should be governed through
transparent democratic processes such as legislative authorization and public rulemaking.") (collecting sources calling for more statutory or administrative rulemaking for police).
297.
Amsterdam, supra note 244, at 439 ("In an age where our shrinking privacy and liberty
would otherwise be enjoyable only at the sufferance of expanding, militaristically organized bodies
of professional police, the fourth amendment demands that an independent judiciary play a direct,
strong role in their regulation."). The two avenues of reform are complementary. The judiciary might
more effectively regulate the police by, for example, only giving deference to police when their
conduct comports with democratically authorized policing rules or giving clearer direction to legislatures about how to craft rules for police. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supranote 296, at 179-83.
298.
Even with greater reliance on administrative regulations or legislative action to constrain
police, "courts still will need to adjudicate the constitutionality of whatever that process comes up
with." Friedman & Stein, supra note 246 (manuscript at 26).
299.
Amsterdam, supra note 244, at 416-29 (explaining that administrative rulemaking by
police would supply "a needed check against arbitrariness," add clarity to the process of evaluating
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Barry Friedman, and Maria Ponomarenko persuasively advocate using
"legislators and law enforcement administrators" to "write the conduct
rules" for street-level law enforcement. 3 0 The Court, however, in seizure
cases like Atwater, Whren, Muehler, and Moore has explicitly rejected
the option of using police norms, departmental regulations, or even state
law to provide backbone to the constitutional concept of reasonableness.301 This is so despite the fact that in numerous other Fourth
Amendment contexts, the Court explicitly relies upon community norms
and objective expectations to define what is reasonable. 30 2
C. More Crimes, More Seizing
The Court is, regrettably, generally silent in seizure cases about the
well-documented problem of overcriminalization in this country. 30 3 But
the connection between the substantive criminal law and the power of
police to seize criminal suspects is direct. As legislators write more criminal laws, they empower police to effect more seizures.
Given the growth in criminal codes, the seriousness of the underlying offense ought to be a relevant consideration when the need for a particular stop or arrest is being evaluated. In other words, an assumption
that probable cause works as a reasonable proxy for the government's
need for a particular seizure does not hold up as criminal codes become
bloated. Justice Marshall articulated a version of this concern in his dispolice conduct, support "local autonomy," increase visibility of individual officer practices, and
develop clearly articulated categories of standard police practice).
300.
John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CAL. L. REV. 205,
208 (2015) (asserting, at least in some contexts, "law enforcement conduct will hew closer to constitutional norms if the Court gets political policy makers to write the conduct rules than if it writes the
rules itself'); see also Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 296, at 106-09; Harmon, Policing,
supra note 296, at 764.

301.

Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (rejecting the argument that an arrest was

unreasonable because it contravened state law); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 103 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting the argument that the use of handcuffs for a two to three hour detention
was unreasonable because it "deviated from standard police procedure"); Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326, 354 (2001) (rejecting the argument that a custodial arrest for a seat belt
violation was unreasonable because it contravened department norms); Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 816-17, 819 (1996) (rejecting argument that traffic stop was unreasonable because department regulations directed that narcotics officers should not make traffic stops).

302.

See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (ex-

plaining that in addition to manifesting an "actual (subjective) expectation of privacy," a person
must establish that "the expectation be one that society is preparedto recognize as 'reasonable"

(emphasis added)).
Douglas Husak's seminal book outlined the broad expansion of potentially criminal con303.
duct and developed "a normative framework to distinguish those criminal laws that are justified from
those that are not." DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
3, 58 (2008) ("Too much criminal law will continue to produce too much punishment until we have a
principled means to limit the scope of the criminal sanction."); see also Daniel Richman, Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options: A Celebration of Bill Stuntz, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 64, 71 (describing the "inexhaustible supply of criminal law in the United States"); Erik Luna, The OvercriminalizationPhe-

nomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 703, 712-19 (2005) (defining and documenting overcriminalization).
But see Mila Sohoni, The Idea of "Too Much Law," 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1622 (2012) (cautioning against quick adoption of hyperlexis critiques).
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sent in Watson.3 0 The Watson majority-holding that police did not
need to obtain warrants for public arrests-defended the decision as preserving "[t]he balance struck by the common law." 305 That characterization, however, glossed over an exponential increase (since the drafting of
the Fourth Amendment) in the number of crimes that qualify as felonies.306 This taxonomy shift meant that the arrest power authorized by
Watson in 1976 was magnitudes greater than the arrest power that existed when the Fourth Amendment was drafted.307
In his dissent, Justice Marshall explained that the seriousness of the
crimes defined as felonies at the founding ensured that the government
was only afforded warrantless arrest power in cases where it most needed
that authority. In Marshall's words:
Applied in its original context, the common-law rule would allow the
warrantless arrest of some, but not all, of those we call felons today.... As a matter of substance, the balance struck by the common
law in accommodating the public need for the most certain and immediate arrest of criminal suspects with the requirement of magisterial oversight to protect against mistaken insults to privacy decreed
that only in the most serious of cases could the warrant be dispensed
with. This balance is not recognized when the common-law rule is
unthinkingly transposed to our present classifications of criminal offenses. 308

The majority rejected this view and did not elaborate on the govemnment's need for greater warrantless arrest power other than to emphasize the general burdens of obtaining an arrest warrant. 309
Watson, as an abiding precedent, continues to broaden police power
every time a new crime is defined. The significant increase in the number
304.

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 441-42 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

305.
Id. at 418, 421 (majority opinion); see also Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 522 (echoing the Watson majority; noting that "[wihile there have been changes to what counts as a felony,
and certainly to what happens after the arrest, the basic balance between liberty and public safety
raised by taking a suspect into custody is the same today as it was at common law").

306.

See Watson, 423 U.S. at 441-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

307.
The fact that the Court was, in its view, simply sanctioning what the vast majority of state
and federal jurisdictions had been doing does not alter this balancing question. Although Watson did
not result in a transformation of the government's de facto seizure power, its cementing of federal
and state practices set a new dejure baseline.

308.

Id. at 442 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 439-41 (Marshal, J., dissenting) ("Only

the most serious crimes were felonies at common law, and many crimes now classified as felonies
under federal or state law were treated as misdemeanors. . . . Applied in its original context, the
common-law rule would allow the warrantless arrest of some, but not all, of those we call felons
today. Accordingly, the Court is simply historically wrong when it tells us that '(t)he balance struck
by the common law in generally authorizing felony arrests on probable cause, but without warrant,
has survived substantially intact."' (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 421 (majority opinion)));
SCHULHOFER, supra note 21, at 51 (noting that the warrantless arrest rule, while "clear enough in the
eighteenth century, has no straightforward meaning in modem circumstances"). Schulhofer explains
that in 1792, "a roughly comparable crime" to the credit card theft and fraud committed by Watson
"would have been a misdemeanor." SCHULHOFER, supra note 21, at 51-52.

309.

Watson, 423 U.S. at 417.

100

DENVER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1

of felony and misdemeanor arrests since Watson can be attributed both to
the continued growth in the criminal code and to the continued professionalization of the police force (where arrests are tracked, counted, and
used as performance measures).3 10
The Court's determination in Atwater that a custodial arrest was
reasonable, even for a traffic violation punishable only by a fine, seems
to foreclose the possibility of using the Fourth Amendment to help address what has since been described as a misdemeanor crisis.311 Indeed,
in 2001, the Court seemed unaware of the rising rates of arrests for minor
offenses. 3 12 The idea that these low-level offenses might pose the greatest
potential for discriminatory enforcement and abuse, however, was clearly
articulated long before Atwater was decided.3 13
The Court's December 2014 decision in Heien v. North Carolina3 14
was similarly silent about questions of overcriminalization. In Heien, the
issue presented to the Court was whether an officer's mistake of law
would invalidate a traffic stop.3 15 Under the mistaken belief that driving
with one broken taillight violated state law, the officer stopped Heien's

310.
See JOHN A. ETERNO & ELI B. SILVERMAN, THE CRIME NUMBERS GAME: MANAGEMENT
BY MANIPULATION 8-9 (2012) (detailing the "story of police reform that has lost its way, gone
astray, and succumbed to short-term numbers games" by departments that have "adopted the statistical performance crime model of police effectiveness"). The President's Task Force on 2 1V Century
Policing expressed concern about the extent to which these kinds of performance incentives (and not
real public safety needs) were driving tickets, summons, and arrests. TASK FORCE, supranote 13, at

26.
See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 73, at 630; Natapoff, supra note 73, at 1320; see also
311.
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1080 (2015) (explaining that Atwater complicates decriminalization efforts because despite "popular perception ...
legally speaking, the reclassification of an offense into a summons-only infraction does not necessarily take arrest and its concomitant burdens off the table").

312.

Compare Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 351-52 (2001) ("The very fact that

the law has never jelled the way Atwater would have it leads one to wonder whether warrantless
misdemeanor arrests need constitutional attention, and there is cause to think the answer is no."),
with Natapoff, supra note 73, at 1320; see also Kohler-Hausmann,supra note 73, at 630. New York
City's recent experience with marijuana arrests demonstrates the problem. From 1994 to 2010, the
City witnessed an exponential increase in marijuana arrests (from approximately 8,000 to over
56,000 per year). Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119
AM. J. Soc. 351, 367 (2013). This phenomenon has been a curiosity because it does not reflect
public enforcement priorities. As Frank Zimring has observed, marijuana clearly did not become a
law enforcement priority at this very late stage of the drug war. ZIMRING, supra note Ill, at 122.
Those arrests, instead, were a tool used to regulate other criminal activity. Id ("These arrests are
police on patrol concentrating effort in high-crime areas and with persons whom police regard as
potential offenders for more senous crimes. But the threshold offense of marijuana provides the
patrolman a method of obtaining fingerprints and removing the suspect from the street. Fundamentally, these arrests are attempts not of drug control but of crime control.").
See Amsterdam, supra note 244, at 415 ("A police officer will always arrest a murderer or
313.
an armed robber if he sees one, but whether he will arrest and search a brawler or a drunk or a loiterer, or make an investigative stop or a frisk or a street interrogation, or order people to 'move
on,' . . . depends upon his mood and inclinations."); see also Fagan & Davies, supra note 75, at 462,
476 (describing increases in low-level arrests); Livingston, supra note 75, at 590 (describing aggres-

sive "quality-of-life enforcement").
314.
135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
315.
Id. at 534.
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car.316 The Court held that the stop was lawful-even though the defendant was not, in fact, violating any traffic provision at the time of the
stop-"[b]ecause the officer's mistake about the brake-light law was
reasonable." 3 17
The Heien decision does not seem particularly controversial or significant except perhaps in one respect. Drawing on strands from both
Atwater and Moore-where the Court also sought to avoid imposing on
officers in the field the burden of knowing the consequences of a particular violation-the Heien decision implicitly accepts as a premise the
massive volume of criminal proscriptions. Although the Court asserted
that its decision "does not discourage officers from learning the law,"3 18
it said nothing about the burden the government arguably should bear for
creating such a vast scheme of criminal laws and penalties.
Justice Sotomayor alluded to these concerns in her dissent in Heien,
noting that "permitting mistakes of law to justify seizures has the perverse effect of preventing or delaying the clarification of the law."3 19
None of the Justices acknowledged that the decision effectively rewarded
the government for creating a complex and admittedly unknowable criminal code. In other words, if so much is criminalized that is not clearly
morally wrong-for example, regulatory offenses like seat belting and
broken taillights-we should not permit the government to rely on the
bulk of the law to justify enhanced contact with citizens. 320
D. CalculatingNecessity: Alternatives, Technology, and Myopia
Calculating the need for a particular seizure also requires meaningful consideration of alternatives. 321 Court decisions that insist that the
Court will never require the police to employ the least intrusive or restrictive alternative to a proposed seizure have been too readily applied
to foreclose any consideration of alternatives, even when the Court
316.

The traffic code required only one operational taillight, so the officer was, in fact, mistak-

en about the law. Id. at 535 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT.

§

2

0-129(g) (2007)). The North Carolina Su-

preme Court cited a nearby conflicting provision to support its conclusion that the mistake was

reasonable. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-129(d) (2007)).
317.
Id. at 534.
318.
Id. at 539.
319.
Id at 543-44 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Giving officers license to effect seizures so
long as they can attach to their reasonable view of the facts some reasonable legal interpretation (or
misinterpretation) that suggests a law has been violated significantly expands this authority.").
320.
It is worth distinguishing here between this concept of overcriminalization (which refers
to the growth of the criminal codes) and the different concept of "hypercriminalization" which
sociologist Victor Rios uses to describe a particular form of overaggressive police profiling. Hypercriminalization, according to Rios, is "the process by which an individual's everyday behaviors and
styles become ubiquitously treated as deviant, risky, threatening, or criminal, across social contexts."
RIOS, supra note 240, at xiv.
321.
Nadine Strossen's 1988 critique of the Court's failures in this regard still rings true.
Strossen, supra note 34, at 176. As Strossen explained, "the Court's fourth amendment balancing
analyses have neither systematically evaluated the marginal law enforcement benefits of challenged
searches and seizures, nor regularly incorporated the 'least intrusive alternative' requirement, which
is an integral component of other balancing tests . . . ." Id.
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adopts categorical changes to the rules governing seizures. 32 2 While the
Court may not want police to have to calculate in absolute terms the least
restrictive alternative in any particular situation, the availability of less
restrictive alternatives is always relevant to reasonableness balancing and
to the calculation of necessity. 3 23
The Court has also been reluctant, in cases like Muehler v. Mena, to
second-guess the government's allocation of available resources in seizure cases. As noted above, Mena was detained when officers investigating one of her tenants came to her home with a search warrant. 324 The
officers' need to detain her in handcuffs (and in her nightclothes) for the
two to three hours that it took them to search the residence was never
adequately explained.325 In fact, details supplied in the concurrence made
clear that any purported need was principally the product of the officers'
decision to assign only two of the eighteen officers on the scene to monitor four detainees.326 The Court upheld the detention as reasonable even
after accepting the plaintiffs assertions that (i) she and the other detainees were not the targets of the search, (ii) they "posed no readily apparent
danger," and (iii) "keeping them handcuffed deviated from standard police procedure." 327
1. The Effect of Technology on Necessity
Because a search is about acquiring information, changes in technology (and behavior) about the collection, storage, maintenance, searching, and dissemination of information have had a significant impact on
the definition and perceived intrusiveness of a search. In plain terms,
developing technologies enable better hiding of information and more

322.

See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 349-50 (2001) (rejecting defendant's

request for a rule forbidding custodial arrest for minor, fine-only offenses and holding that requiring
police to not arrest when they are unsure about severity of offense "would boil down to something
akin to a least-restrictive-alternative limitation, which is itself one of those 'ifs, ands, and buts' rules,
generally thought inappropriate in working out Fourth Amendment protection" (citation omitted));
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) ("The reasonableness of the officer's decision to
stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques."); United

States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985) ("A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of
police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the
police might have been accomplished.").
323.
Strossen, supra note 34, at 1238 ("If the benefits which flow from one measure could be
substantially achieved through a second measure entailing lesser costs, the latter should surely be
deemed more reasonable, on balance, than the former.").

324.
325.
326.

Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98-99 (2005).
See id. at 98-100.
Id. at 103-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

327.
Id. ("Where the detainees outnumber those supervising them, and this situation could not
be remedied without diverting officers from an extensive, complex, and time-consuming search, the
continued use of handcuffs after the initial sweep may be justified, subject to adjustments or temporary release under supervision to avoid pain or excessive physical discomfort.").
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sophisticated seeking.328 The Court's recent search jurisprudence reflects
its efforts to adapt to both sorts of changes. 32 9
There are, however, no recent (or projected) technological changes
in the seizure context that have impacted the individual's experience of a
seizure. Indeed, his observation that the law of arrest is an example of a
"law enforcement tool or fact pattern [that is] essentially impervious to
change" is what prompted Orin Kerr to conclude that "the basic balance
between liberty and public safety raised by taking a suspect into custody
is the same today as it was at common law." 330 Kerr's conclusion, however, ignores an important variable: while the physical nature of a seizure
may not vary with technology, the government's purported need for the
intrusion might.
There are a number of available and evolving technologies that
might affect the need for a seizure. For example, if the need to ensure an
individual's appearance in court is driving the government need to take
low-level offenders33 and material witnesses 332 into custody, then sophisticated GPS tracking technologies can reduce that necessity. The
increasing availability of body-scanning devices may make claims of
urban police departments that regular street stops are necessary to detect
and deter gun possession less compelling. 333 Use of cameras and other
technology to detect traffic offenses (or development of other mechanisms for issuing citations for traffic offenses) makes car stops less necessary. 334 More extensive camera surveillance in high-crime neighborhoods ought to reduce the need for aggressive stop-and-frisk policing
strategies. Indeed, significant advances in (and employment of) technology enabling physical surveillance and transaction surveillance 335 ought
328.
See Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 23, at 480. Of course, another key part of the equation,
particularly, in the last fifteen years, is the heightened security environment and the government's
aggressive deployment of novel technologies to detect and manage potential security threats.
SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 3-4 ("A second difference between the surveillance of yesteryear and
today is the strength of the government's resolve to use it. Especially since September 11, 2001, the
United States government has been obsessed, as perhaps it should be, with ferreting out national
security threats, and modem surveillance techniques . .. have played a major role in this pursuit.").

329.
See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484-85 (2014) (warrantless search of cell
phone incident to arrest held unconstitutional); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013)
(DNA swabbing of arrestees constitutional); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012)
(warrantless GPS tracking unconstitutional); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (warrantless use of thermal heat imager unconstitutional).

330.
Kerr, Equilibrium, supranote 23, at 517, 522.
331.
See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S.
164, 176 (2008).
332.
See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011).
333.
But cf Erin Murphy, Paradigms ofRestraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1372 (2008) (cautioning
against the assumption that "technological restraints are always preferable to physical ones").
334.
Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 199, 221 (2007) ("By remotely and automatically enforcing the laws normally used
by police to conduct traffic stops, DSRC [dedicated short-range communication] systems could
eliminate or drastically reduce the number of police-conducted traffic stops.").
335.
SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 7-9 (describing five categories of physical surveillance,
including "cameras, tracking devices, telescopic devices, illumination devices, and detection devices
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to reduce or delay the need for seizures in criminal investigations. One
simple way to improve a frequently used calculation of necessity is to
require more data for establishing claims like "high-crime area." 336
Other technologies might reduce the likelihood that a police encounter might result in excessive or deadly force. The President's Task
Force on 21st Century Policing cited studies that found that the use of
body-worn cameras seemed to act as a sort of deterrent for the officers
who wore them: they "reduce[d] . . . officer[s'] use of force" in stops and
arrests.337 The same Task Force report described advances in "less than
lethal" technology that are being developed to reduce the number of cases where police resort to deadly force. 33 8
In general, the Court is more effective at articulating the burdens
that technology imposes on law enforcement than it is at identifying
those burdens that technology alleviates. 33 9 Sometimes, as in the warrant
context, technology evolves in ways that could justify less intrusion than
had been necessary to satisfy the needs of earlier police departments.
The Court's holding in Watson, discussed in Section L.A above, was
premised, in part, on the perceived "encumbrance" that an arrest warrant
requirement would impose on police.3 4 Technology has changed, however, in ways that call into question the reasonableness balancing that
yielded the Watson result. The possibility of obtaining, from the field,
near-immediate telephonic warrants makes the consideration of the question presented in Watson a much different proposition today than it was
in 1976 (and worlds apart from the situation in 1789).341 As Oren BarGill and Barry Friedman have recently observed:
Feasibility and exigency are both functions of technology, which operates in today's world to favor warrants.. . . For too long we have
lived with a caricature of the warrant process: a detective pounding
out a warrant request in triplicate on a battered Smith Corona, assuredly a time-consuming task almost impossible to meet in the fastpaced arena of police work. We do not live in that world, however,
(i.e., devices capable of detecting concealed items)"); see also id. at 51-70 (discussing the limitations of current Fourth Amendment protections in these contexts); id. at 9-12, 168-91 (discussing
"target-driven transaction surveillance" much of which can be obtained without either a warrant or
even a third-party subpoena; this includes collection of decades of general financial and public
records information from commercial data brokers, more specific financial transaction information,
phone records, click-stream data, and email records, among other types of data).
336.
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The "High-Crime Area" Question:
Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Anal-

ysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1642-43 (2008).
337.

TASK FORCE, supra note 13, at 32.

338.

Id. at 37-38.

339.
The role that technology should play in reducing the need for Fourth Amendment intrusions is the subject of a separate work in progress.

340.
See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976).
341.
Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1609,
1614-15 (2012).
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and have not for some time.... If a magistrate is not on hand, technology can often fill the gap; telephonic warrants are increasingly
commonplace.... In short, today's technology makes obtaining
permission from an official remote from the heat of the decision fast
and easy.342

In the search context, the Court has begun to adjust the definition of
reasonableness to reflect technological advances. The Court's recent
decisions in Missouri v. McNeely 343 and Riley v. California3 both
acknowledged technological developments (and corresponding rule
changes) that have increased the ability of officers to obtain warrants
remotely. 345 As the McNeely Court explained: "[T]echnological developments that enable police officers to secure warrants more quickly, and
do so without undermining the neutral magistrate judge's essential role
as a check
on police discretion, are relevant to an assessment of exigen34 6
cy.,,

Although there is no suggestion (yet) that the Court is inclined to
revisit the question of requiring more arrest warrants, any modem defense of (and reliance on) the Watson holding should acknowledge the
Court's response to changing technologies in other Fourth Amendment
contexts.
Similarly, one of the prevailing arguments in Atwater was that it
would be too cumbersome to require officers to know which misdemeanor offenses were fine only.347 The Atwater majority did not consider
whether it was difficult for any officer to obtain that information through
existing mechanisms-nor did it consider the possibility that a readily
accessible police database could be easily developed. If not then, certain-

342.
343.
344.

Id (footnote omitted).
133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).

345.
In McNeely, the Court noted the changes over time of advancements in technology as they
relate to obtaining warrants by looking at the amendments of the federal rules (a magistrate judge
could once issue a warrant via a telephone conversation; the rules now permit issuance of a warrant
via telephone or other electronic communication). McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1562 (allowing a magistrate judge to "consider 'information communicated by telephone or other reliable electronic
means'" (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.1)). The McNeely Court also recognized that in some jurisdictions, prosecutors may apply for warrants via radio, telephone, email, and video conferencing and in
some cases can receive a signed warrant in less than fifteen minutes. Id. at 1562; see also id. at 1573
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing warrants received via email to
iPads). In Riley, while acknowledging that a warrant requirement may hinder police, the Court
described the ease with which warrants can be obtained because of the advances of technology in
recent years. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 ("Recent technological advances similar to those discussed
here have, in addition, made the process of obtaining a warrant itself more efficient.").

346.

McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1562-63 (acknowledging, however, the delays built into any

warrant process).

347.

See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 348 (2001) ("It is not merely that we

cannot expect every police officer to know the details of frequently complex penalty schemes but
that penalties for ostensibly identical conduct can vary on account of facts difficult (if not impossible) to know at the scene of an arrest." (citation omitted)).
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ly now. Indeed, as Chief Justice Roberts recently observed in the Riley
case: "[T]here's an app for that." 348
2. Necessity and Myopia
As the 2014 protests have made clear, aggressive stop-and-arrest
practices also inflict broad, long-term damage by undermining the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system. 34 9 These approaches
may actually backfire in the long run by alienating communities and by
possibly increasing the delinquency rates among community members. 350
The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing emphasized this
need for "legitimacy" in its May 2015 report: "[P]eople are more likely
to obey the law" when those who enforce it are perceived to be "acting in
procedurally just ways." 35 ' In support of the goal of "build[ing] public
trust and legitimacy," the Task Force emphasized the need for a shift in
law enforcement culture from a more aggressive and confrontational
"warrior-mindset" to a more protective "guardian" approach.3 52
Fourth Amendment questions are too often presented as zero-sum
choices between competing (and never coextensive) public-safety and
liberty interests. 353 The obvious liberty costs of expanding seizure authority are viewed by the Court as being offset by the asserted law enforcement interests. But what if the government is not particularly good at
calculating its security interests-either because its community focus is
too narrow or its time horizon is too short? Increasing executive branch
awareness of this issue is reassuring. As the President's Task Force explained: "Crime reduction is not self-justifying. Overly aggressive law

348.

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.

349.
See FACT SHEET, supra note 13 ("As the nation has observed, trust between law enforcement agencies and the people they protect and serve is essential to the stability of our communities,
the integrity of our criminal justice system, and the safe and effective delivery of policing services."); see also Anderson, supra note 5 (explaining that racial biases that are evident from stop and
frisk data "extend to other forms of aggressive policing, causing black people to associate police
officers with humiliation and injustice, and stirring distrust for police in black communities around
the country"); cf Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable
Policies and the ProceduralJustice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 348 (2011)
("The research on cooperation finds that willingness to assist the police-for example, by reporting
suspicious behavior or by participating in crime prevention programs-is strongly linked to a person's belief that police authority is legitimate. And that belief is strong only when officials exercise
their authority fairly.").
350.
JENNIFER FRATELLO ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, COMING OF AGE WITH STOP AND
FRISK: EXPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS, AND PUBLIC SAFETY IMPLICATIONS 6 (2013) ("[I]ntensive
policing can actually 'backfire' and weaken conventional norms among residents and their willingness to cooperate with police, eventually leading to higher levels of crime." (footnotes omitted));
Stephanie A. Wiley & Finn-Aage Esbensen, The Effect ofPolice Contact: Does Official Intervention
Result in DevianceAmplification?, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 1, 16-19 (2013).
TASK FORCE, supra note 13, at 1.
351.

352.

Id. at 1, I1-12.

353.
See Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment Enforcement, 2010
U. ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1483 (criticizing "the Court's insistence in Fourth Amendment cases that
collective interests are always in tension with individual interests, and never in tension with each

other").
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enforcement strategies can potentially harm communities and do lasting
damage to public trust." 354

This is a message that is too often missing in Court analyses of the
government's power to seize individuals under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court, too, has a more active role to play to ensure that longer term
public-safety costs of broadened seizure authority are weighed in the
balance.
CONCLUSION

Over the last fifteen years, the Court's reasonableness balancing in
cases involving seizures of people has yielded greater authority to the
government and significantly narrowed the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. Police make more arrests for minor offenses. They employ
stop-and-frisk policies in ways that far exceed the "carefully guarded"
approach initially envisioned by the Terry Court. The Court has largely
withdrawn from regulation of "consensual" encounters. Lines previously
drawn in checkpoint cases, in search warrant-seizure cases, and in cases
involving police use of force have shifted and blurred.
These trends are based, in some measure, on the Court's underestimation of the individual rights and community interests at stake in these
cases. Close examination of the cases reveals that this expansion has
been driven, in large part, by the Court's reluctance to scrutinize the other side of the balance: the government's need to detain a particular criminal suspect (or category of potential suspects). This must change. The
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures is meaningless if the Court does not play an active role in restraining aggressive
police power.

354.
TASK FORCE, supra note 13, at 16; see also id. at 42 ("It must also be stressed that the
absence of crime is not the final goal of law enforcement. Rather, it is the promotion and protection

of public safety while respecting the dignity and rights of all.").

